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“CAN I HAVE SOME PRIVACY?”: A LOOK INTO THE
UNFORTUNATE TRUTH OF PREGNANCY TESTS
THROUGHOUT SPORTS AND THE
NEGATIVE IMPACT ON FEMALE
ATHLETES
I. “CAN YOU DO THAT?”: QUESTIONING CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISPRUDENCE SURROUNDING FORCED PREGNANCY TESTS
Historically, employers have implemented drug tests to ensure
employees are not under the influence of dangerous substances
while they are at work.1  Due to the toll many drugs could take on
workplace productivity and safety, courts generally uphold preem-
ployment drug testing.2  Most notably, in 1989, the Supreme Court
affirmed these traditional workplace values in Skinner v. Railway La-
bor Executives Ass’n.3  In Skinner, the Supreme Court found that,
while a urine drug test is inherently intrusive, the constitutionality
of the test under the Fourth Amendment depends upon the intru-
sive scope of the testing environment.4  In holding that the em-
ployer’s drug test in Skinner was constitutional, the Court noted that
drug testing, in that employment context, is essential to the safety
and function of the job.5  Since the Skinner decision, courts have
upheld those urine drug tests that are found to be otherwise
reasonable.6
1. See Lydia DePillis, Companies Drug Test a Lot Less than They Used to—Because It
Doesn’t Really Work, WASH. POST (Mar. 10, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/wonk/wp/2015/03/10/companies-drug-test-a-lot-less-than-they-used-
to-because-it-doesnt-really-work/ [https://perma.cc/GQ4K-JML2] (adding drug
testing in workplaces became very popular when President Reagan initiated War
on Drugs and required all federal employees be drug tested).
2. See DAVID EVANS, DRUG TESTING LAW, TECHNOLOGY, AND PRACTICE § 3.2
(2019) (adding courts will also approve drug testing policies to discourage illegal
conduct and to provide “cost effective method to reduce employer costs associated
with drug abuse”).
3. 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (addressing constitutionality of drug testing in federal
employer environment). But see Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997) (holding
state’s drug tests were not narrowly tailored to constitutional requirements to suffi-
ciently justify administering random tests).
4. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626-27 (noting urine drug test is less likely to be
found as Fourth Amendment violation when test itself is not so intrusive that test
taker is being watched during entire process).
5. See id. at 631 (detailing further that requiring employer to have reasonable
suspicion before drug testing would unreasonably burden employer).
6. Compare EVANS, supra note 2 (detailing recent case law upholding various R
employment drug testing policies), with Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 308 (3d
(171)
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Similarly, courts allow public schools to conduct drug tests on
students when the search is reasonably invasive and has a clear
safety purpose.7  Public schools must adhere to constitutional re-
quirements, both because they act as an arm of the government and
because the ideal educational environment fosters free speech and
thought.8  According to the Supreme Court, achieving an effective
American education requires protecting free speech:
[I]n view of the nature of the teacher’s relation to the ef-
fective exercise of the rights which are safeguarded by the
Bill of Rights and by the Fourteenth Amendment, inhibi-
tion of freedom of thought, and of action upon thought,
in the case of teachers brings the safeguards of those
amendments vividly into operation. Such unwarranted in-
hibition upon the free spirit of teachers . . . has an unmis-
takable tendency to chill that free play of the spirit which
all teachers ought especially to cultivate and practice . . . .9
Consequently, students have constitutional rights in schools and ad-
ministrators must abide by those limitations.10
Cir. 2000) (striking down forced pregnancy test for single girl on high school swim
team).
7. See, e.g., Board of Educ. of Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v.
Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 838 (2002) (upholding school’s drug testing policy where
school had legitimate interest in preventing rampant drug use among students);
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-65 (1995) (providing example
of sufficiently narrowly tailored drug test to accommodate both legal and educa-
tional considerations); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341-42 (1985) (creating
two-step test to determine whether search conducted by school was reasonable).
8. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) (“The vigilant protection of
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American
schools.”). See generally Justin Driver, Do Public School Students Have Constitutional
Rights?, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/31/opin
ion/public-school-constitution-rights.html [https://perma.cc/4GWJ-236X] (ex-
plaining evolution of Supreme Court treatment of relationship between schools
and Constitution).
9. Shelton, 364 U.S. at 487 (emphasizing necessity of holding educators ac-
countable for constitutional standards) (quoting Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S.
183, 195 (1952) (Frankfuter, J., concurring) (alterations in original)).
10. See Stephen Sawchuk, What Are Students’ Constitutional Rights?, EDUC. WEEK
(May 7, 2019), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2019/05/08/what-are-stu
dents-constitutional-rights.html [https://perma.cc/R56E-BNCC] (listing specific
instances in which students can exercise their inherent constitutional rights); see,
e.g., York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200, 178 P.3d 995, 1006 (Wash. 2008) (find-
ing school cannot implement suspicion-less drug testing on student-athletes be-
cause to do so would violate inherent privacy rights of Washington residents); see
also Driver, supra note 8 (quoting Justice Stevens writing that “[t]he schoolroom is R
the first opportunity most citizens have to experience the power of government”).
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For example, in Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,11 the Su-
preme Court found that testing student-athletes for drug use consti-
tuted a reasonable search because the school had a legitimate
interest in knowing whether students were using illegal sub-
stances.12  Further, the school narrowed the search to student-ath-
letes because administrators had evidence that those students were
at the center of the drug problem.13  Therefore, the Court found
the drug test to be reasonably related to the school’s legitimate
safety concerns.14
While courts accept school drug tests in a limited capacity,
these decisions do not give schools free reign to search their stu-
dents for personal bodily information.15  Although urine drug tests
and urine pregnancy tests are superficially similar, courts are much
more reluctant to find that urine pregnancy tests are reasonable
because of the incredible privacy risks associated with a pregnancy
test.16  By revealing pregnancy information, a woman exposes her-
self to judgment about her age, her sexual history, and how she
chooses to handle the pregnancy.17  On the contrary, drug tests
only reveal whether a student is engaging in illegal drug activity;
11. 515 U.S. 646 (explaining inherent constitutional rights of students).
12. See id. at 663-64 (finding drug test focused on athletes to be reasonable
and constitutional).
13. See id. at 658 (describing other limits of drug test, including only testing
for drug use, only testing athletes, and only releasing results of drug test to select
number of school administrators); see also York, 178 P.3d at 1006 (striking down
drug testing student-athletes because test was not narrowly tailored to meet legiti-
mate school interests).
14. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 664-65 (reasserting constitutionality of drug test).
15. See Megan A. Lewis, Comment, Testing Students for Pregnancy: How Far Will
the Courts Allow Schools to Go?, 33 MCGEORGE L. REV. 155, 176-77 (2001) (noting
courts have acknowledged great privacy interests in pregnancy information, in-
cluding sexual history and possible abortions or miscarriages in future).
16. See Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir.
1998) (holding pregnancy is highly private and sensitive piece of medical informa-
tion); Ascolese v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 925 F. Supp. 351 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (finding
pregnancy test to be obvious intrusion of employee privacy). Compare Debra Stang
& Judith Marcin, M.D., Urine Drug Test, HEALTHLINE, https://www.healthline.com/
health/urine-drug-screen [https://perma.cc/6QVL-7M5B] (last visited Mar. 3,
2020) (describing drug test as taking urine sample and testing sample in lab for
presence of drugs), with Anna Giorgi & Carolyn Kay, M.D., Urine hCG Level Test,
HEALTHLINE PARENTHOOD, https://www.healthline.com/health/hcg-in-urine#
TOC_TITLE_HDR_1 [https://perma.cc/F6PV-AZMA] (last visited Mar. 3, 2020)
(describing pregnancy test as urine test that searches for certain hormones related
to pregnancy). See generally Lewis, supra note 15, at 175-79 (analyzing similarities R
between Ascolese and Norman-Bloodsaw).
17. See Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1269 (finding pregnancy tests carry far-
reaching implications that courts must consider in privacy analysis); see also Lewis,
supra note 15, at 180-81 (comparing government interest in testing for pregnancy R
with government interest in testing for drug use).
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thus, policies are properly tailored to maintain the safety of the
school.18
Pregnancy tests cannot be narrowly tailored to address an issue
of illegal activity in schools, however, because a young person’s
pregnancy status does not indicate that the girl has engaged in ille-
gal activity.19  In fact, in the few cases that address mandatory preg-
nancy tests, the courts emphasize the inherent medical and
personal privacy contained in a pregnancy test.20  These courts rea-
son that revealing someone’s pregnancy status reveals their sexual
history and, if they choose to terminate the pregnancy, opens them
up to criticism about their decision.21
Additionally, if a school implemented mandatory drug tests,
both male and female student would be impacted.22  When a school
implements mandatory pregnancy tests, only female students, pri-
marily female athletes, are impacted.23  Since courts are reluctant
18. See Lewis, supra note 15, at 156-168 (describing multiple cases where drug R
tests were upheld because drug use was large problem in public school arena). See
e.g., Board of Educ. of Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls, 536 U.S.
822, 838 (upholding school’s drug policy, even though it was not narrowly tailored
to just athletes, who represent the population with largest drug use); Vernonia, 515
U.S. at 664-65 (finding school’s policy of suspicion-less drug testing constitutional).
19. See Martha Kempner, The Lesson of Delhi Charter School: It’s Time to Truly
Support Pregnant and Parenting Teens, REWIRE.NEWS (Aug. 13, 2012), https://re
wire.news/article/2012/08/13/not-kicking-them-out-is-not-enough-its-time-to-
truly-support-pregnant-and-parenti/ [https://perma.cc/LZN5-NNEN] (explain-
ing forced pregnancy test policies inevitably make girls feel like criminals for en-
gaging in perfectly legal activities); see also Lewis, supra note 15, at 180-81 R
(explaining that there is little illegal activity, aside from possible statutory rape,
that could be gleaned from forced pregnancy test).
20. See Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1269 (“Pregnancy is likewise, for many,
an intensely private matter, which also may pertain to one’s sexual history and
often carries far-reaching societal implications”); Ascolese, 902 F. Supp. at 550 (dis-
cussing several reasons for keeping pregnancy private, including “fear of disclosure
to employees; the desire to avoid disclosing a subsequent miscarriage or abortion;
and the desire to avoid possible stigma or discrimination by their employer”). See
generally Lewis, supra note 15, at 175-79 (discussing briefly caselaw relating to em- R
ployer-mandated and school-mandated pregnancy tests).
21. See Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1269 (finding positive and negative social
stigma surround women when pregnancy status is revealed); Ascolese, 902 F. Supp.
at 550 (acknowledging potential abortion or miscarriage, both very sensitive occur-
rences, could be revealed to office or school without woman wanting that informa-
tion to be revealed).
22. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658 (addressing mandated and randomized drug
tests for both male and female student athletes who were assumed to contribute to
rampant drug culture at school). See generally Lewis, supra note 15, at 162-64 (dis- R
cussing facts and rationale of Vernonia).
23. See, e.g., Tiseme Zegeye, Get Tested or Get Out: School Forces Pregnancy Tests on
Girls, Kicks out Students Who Refuse or are Pregnant, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Aug.
6, 2012), https://www.aclu.org/blog/speakeasy/get-tested-or-get-out-school-
forces-pregnancy-tests-girls-kicks-out-students-who [https://perma.cc/B2UT-
XTPN] (“Besides violating Title IX, the policy is also in violation of the Constitu-
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to accept an employer-mandated pregnancy test, it should follow
that courts will similarly be reluctant to accept a mandatory, school-
ordered pregnancy test that is taken by students.24  Under these
mandated policies, female students unwillingly risk unveiling their
most personal, private, and potentially embarrassing information to
their teachers, administrators, and even their peers.25  Specifically,
female student-athletes are categorically more impacted because
school administrators claim they have a right to know pregnancy
status for the safety of the athlete and the baby.26  Contrarily, when
a school implements a drug test, both males and females are im-
pacted, putting the sexes on equal footing.27  Accordingly, in ad-
dressing mandatory pregnancy tests for student-athletes, courts
should almost always find that a student’s Fourth Amendment right
to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures outweighs the
school’s interest in obtaining student pregnancy information.28
Courts should only find for the school in very rare and special cir-
cumstances, for example, when the health of the student is in dan-
ger, which will be discussed further later in this Comment.29
tion’s due process right to procreate, and equal protection: it treats female stu-
dents differently from male students and relies on archaic stereotypes linked to sex
and pregnancy.”).
24. See Lewis, supra note 15, at 168-84 (discussing case law rationale, specifi- R
cally from Gruenke, in pointing out that even though public school students have
lower expectation of privacy than adult employees, high privacy interest in preg-
nancy information still remains with students).
25. See id. at 185 (noting that pregnancy, especially young pregnancy, carries
negative societal implications about sexual behavior and, possibly, about subse-
quent personal decisions regarding whether to terminate pregnancy).
26. See Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 301 (3d Cir. 2000) (“Although student
athletes have a very limited expectation of privacy, a school cannot compel a stu-
dent to take a pregnancy test absent a legitimate health concern about a possible
pregnancy. . . . [A]n official cannot, however, require a student to submit to this
intrusion merely to satisfy his curiosity.”).  In most cases, however, exercise is not
harmful to the athlete or to the baby. See Issues Related to Pregnancy & Athletic Partic-
ipation, WOMEN’S SPORTS FOUND. 2, https://www.womenssportsfoundation.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/11/issues-related-to-pregnancy-and-athletic-participation-
the-foundation-position.pdf [https://perma.cc/59ZJ-SAQ7] (last visited June 4,
2020) (arguing decision to continue athletic participation should be between ath-
lete and physician); see, e.g., Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 297 (noting medical official told
defendant in this case that plaintiff could continue exercising during her
pregnancy).
27. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 649-50 (1995) (address-
ing mandated and randomized drug tests for both male and female student-ath-
letes who were assumed to contribute to rampant drug culture at school). See
generally Lewis, supra note 15, at 162-64 (discussing facts and rationale of Vernonia). R
28. For further discussion on caselaw trend regarding mandatory student
pregnancy tests and how to emphasize that trend in future cases, see infra notes
224-251 and accompanying text. R
29. For further discussion on circumstances under which courts should find
that mandated pregnancy test of student is necessary, see infra notes 239-241 and R
5
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The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution pro-
tects Americans from unreasonable searches and seizures by the
government.30  Generally, a search is an invasion of property for the
purpose of obtaining information.31  A search without a warrant is
presumptively unreasonable, but the search can still be reasonable
if (1) the person subjected to the search has a subjective expecta-
tion of privacy, and (2) society is prepared to accept that expecta-
tion as reasonable.32  Otherwise, the search is unreasonable and,
thus, unconstitutional.33  Looking at forced pregnancy tests
through a Fourth Amendment lens shifts the conversation to truly
understanding whether a pregnancy test is unconstitutional.34  Con-
sequently, courts can send a stricter message to schools that forcing
pregnancy tests has indelible and dangerous constitutional
implications.35
This Comment explores the intricacies of Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence and its relation to forced pregnancy tests in athlet-
ics.36  While the caselaw undoubtedly recognizes that pregnancy
tests are a search, the rationale of the caselaw does not adequately
emphasize the privacy interests at stake, thus failing to deter schools
accompanying text. See, e.g., Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 301 (“This is not to say that a
student, athlete or not, cannot be required to take a pregnancy test. There may be
unusual instances where a school nurse or another appropriate school official has
legitimate concerns about the health of the student or her unborn child.”).
30. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”).
31. See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404-05 (2012) (“It is important to
be clear about what occurred in this case: The Government physically occupied
private property for the purpose of obtaining information. We have no doubt that
such a physical intrusion would have been considered a ‘search’ within the mean-
ing of the Fourth Amendment when it was adopted.”).
32. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(bifurcating issue to find that majority’s analysis requires two-step process).
33. See id. at 359 (majority opinion) (finding listening to conversation in tele-
phone booth is unreasonable and unconstitutional search).
34. See, e.g., Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260,
1269-70 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding undoubtedly pregnancy tests are searches that
have Fourth Amendment implications); Ascolese v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 925 F.
Supp. 351, 354-64 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (balancing interests of government in forced
pregnancy testing against privacy interests of tested employee in Fourth Amend-
ment analysis).
35. For further discussion on how to eliminate forced pregnancy tests by en-
forcing the Constitution, see infra notes 224-292 and accompanying text. R
36. For further discussion on the connections between Fourth Amendment
and forced pregnancy tests, see infra notes 246-251 and accompanying text. R
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and employers from implementing forced tests.37  Part Two pro-
vides a brief background on the evolution of legal protection in the
movement for gender equality.38  A brief overview of the female
athlete’s struggle to be paid or treated equally to their male coun-
terparts provides a foundation that highlights the necessity of find-
ing that forced pregnancy tests are inherently unconstitutional and
discriminatory.39  Part Three includes an in-depth analysis of cases
dealing with Fourth Amendment searches, particularly pregnancy
tests, in both athletic and non-athletic contexts.40  Analyzing both
the athletic and non-athletic jurisprudence forces the conclusion
that interests in maintaining privacy before, during, and after a
pregnancy are extremely high, regardless of whether the test is
given to an athlete, student, or employee.41  Finally, Part Four dis-
cusses the negative emotional and social implications of forcing
young females to submit to pregnancy tests.42  Courts must acknowl-
edge the negative social and psychological impacts of allowing
forced pregnancy policies to fully grasp the associated privacy
violation.43
Overall, this Comment emphasizes how looking at the preg-
nancy tests through a Fourth Amendment lens not only highlights
gender disparities in sports, but also implicates traditional privacy
values.44  With gender equality at the forefront of the news cycle,
now is the most opportune time to correct all systemic and inten-
tional gender inequalities, in all aspects.45  If courts continuously
37. See Lewis, supra note 15, at 168-69 (critiquing Third Circuit in Gruenke for R
putting too little emphasis on privacy interests at stake for young athlete being
forced to take pregnancy test).
38. For further discussion on strides taken for equality in the past century
alone, see infra notes 80-118 and accompanying text. R
39. For further discussion on the importance of finding that pregnancy infor-
mation has too high of privacy interest to be intruded upon by government, see
infra notes 252-292 and accompanying text. R
40. For further discussion on caselaw and scholarship surrounding pregnancy
tests and the Fourth Amendment, see infra notes 170-245 and accompanying text. R
41. For further discussion on jurisprudence regarding athletic and non-ath-
letic forced pregnancy tests, see infra notes 197-245 and accompanying text. R
42. For further discussion on the dangers of invading into such private infor-
mation, see infra notes 252-302 and accompanying text. R
43. For further discussion on the societal impacts of forced pregnancy tests,
see infra notes 252-302 and accompanying text. R
44. For further discussion on main tenets of this Comment, see infra notes
128-187 and accompanying text. R
45. See Associated Press, U.N. Chief: Gender Inequality Biggest Human Rights Chal-
lenge, POLITICO (Mar. 8, 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/03/08/
un-chief-gender-inequality-biggest-human-rights-challenge-123536 [https://
perma.cc/2L4B-E66M] (demonstrating necessity for tangible and immediate
change in gender disparities).
7
Rogers: Can I Have Some Privacy?: A Look Into the Unfortunate Truth Of Pr
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository,
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\28-1\VLS105.txt unknown Seq: 8  4-JAN-21 11:50
178 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28: p. 171
choose not to protect young females’ privacy rights, women will au-
tomatically be at a disadvantage when compared to men, both in
school and in the workplace.46  The courts can no longer accepta-
bly bypass these obvious disadvantages.47  Therefore, this Comment
argues forced pregnancy tests should not be allowed in athletics be-
cause allowing otherwise would contravene the Constitution and
unfairly disadvantage young females.48
II. EVOLUTION OF EQUALITY IN SPORTS
This section discusses the evolution of legal prohibitions on
gender discrimination.49  Unfortunately, despite the wide array of
laws that have been implemented in the past century, female ath-
letes continue to struggle to find true equality.50  By comparing the
legal progressions with the continued struggle of female athletes,
the gaps between expected protection and actual implementation
become stark.51  Therefore, this context is essential for understand-
ing future steps that must be taken to protect female athletes.52
Namely, this section touches on the female athlete’s struggle for
pay equality and for the termination of discrimination because of
pregnancy or the ability to become pregnant.53
A. Yes, Gender Discrimination Still Exists
Female athletes have experienced and continue to experience
unfortunate and consistent disadvantages in athletics, especially
when compared to their male counterparts.54  Namely, female ath-
46. See Kempner, supra note 19 (explaining that forced pregnancy tests put R
girls at disadvantage because they are being punished for behavior that men and
boys also engage in).
47. For further discussion on negative impact of forced pregnancy tests, see
infra notes 252-292 and accompanying text. See Kempner, supra note 19 (detailing R
all disadvantages that girls face when they are forced to take pregnancy tests).
48. For further discussion on the intricacies of argument presented in this
Comment, see infra notes 128-187 and accompanying text. R
49. For further discussion on the legal development of anti-discrimination
law, see infra note 80-118 and accompanying text. R
50. For further discussion on modern equality struggles, see infra note 93-118 R
and accompanying text.
51. For further discussion on the differences between legal progression and
practical implementation, see infra notes 54-118 and accompanying text. R
52. For further discussion on how to better equality between female and male
athletes, see infra notes 252-302 and accompanying text. R
53. For further discussion on struggle for pay equality and ending pregnancy
discrimination, see infra notes 54-118 and accompanying text. R
54. See Sarah Mervosh & Christina Caron, 8 Times Women in Sports Fought for
Equality, N. Y. TIMES (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/08/
sports/women-sports-equality.html [https://perma.cc/VF96-RFVL] (demonstrat-
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letes, despite their success, are consistently paid less than less-suc-
cessful male athletes.55  For example, in a recent WNBA season, the
average salary was $117,500, compared to the $6.4 million average
salary in the NBA.56  Additionally, female soccer players on the
United States Women’s National Team are paid approximately a
third of the salary paid to male soccer players on the United States
Men’s National Team.57  Despite the historical mistreatment in ath-
letics, the evolution of gender equality in general provides female
athletes with the foundations to argue for better treatment.58  More
and more, the sports realm sees female athletes come forward to
fight equality on a legal basis.59
Most notably, the passage of the Equal Pay Act in 1963 contrib-
uted the modern women’s rights movement.60  The Equal Pay Act
prohibits wages to employees at a lower rate than other employees
“of the opposite sex in such establishment for equal work on jobs
ing decades-long fight for athletic equality by detailing male attempts to physically
eject woman from Boston Marathon in 1967).
55. See Olivia Abrams, Why Female Athletes Earn Less than Men across Most Sports,
FORBES (June 23, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/oliviaabrams/2019/06/
23/why-female-athletes-earn-less-than-men-across-most-sports/#4bc8ac8040fb
[https://perma.cc/FV2T-BBNT] (identifying only sport that does not have such
evident pay gap between men and women is tennis).
56. See id. (noting National Pro Fastpitch softball league has salary cap of
$175,000 while Boston Red Sox allotted $227 million alone to players’ salaries);
Tom Huddleston Jr., These are the Highest Paid Players in the NBA Right Now, CNBC
(Oct. 22, 2019), https://www.cnbc.com/2019/10/22/highest-paid-players-in-the-
nba-right-now.html [https://perma.cc/W6TA-C3CH] (noting current season of
NBA would increase average player salary to $7.7 million).
57. See Graham Hays, USWNT Lawsuit: What We Know and What it Means Going
Forward, ESPN (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.espn.com/espnw/sports/story/_/id/
26196105/uswnt-files-lawsuit-us-soccer-federation-means-women-world-cup
[https://perma.cc/E2V7-QTLW] (demonstrating gross disparity between male
and female pay in United States soccer).  For further discussion on the United
States Women’s National Team and their struggle for pay equality, see infra notes
63-79 and accompanying text. R
58. See generally Sarah Kanoy, Comment, Pregnancy Clauses in Female Athletic
Contracts: Discriminatory, or Just the Industry Standard?, 85 UMKC L. REV. 1033, 1034-
38 (2017) (setting foundation to demonstrate parallel between evolving gender
equality standards in general and evolving equality standards in sports).
59. See, e.g., Rachel Bachman, In 2019, Women Insisted that Sports Pay Up, WALL
STREET J. (Dec. 27, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/in-2019-women-insisted-
that-sports-pay-up-11577448001 [https://perma.cc/GE4C-JBUJ] (noting in 2019
alone, at least three major athletic entities, including United States Women’s Na-
tional Team and Simone Biles, have demanded more equality in sports).
60. See Kanoy, supra note 58, at 1035 (stating another monumental moment R
for women’s rights movement in 1960s came when Food and Drug Administration
approved use of birth control pills). See generally 29 U.S.C. § 206 (2016) (prohibit-
ing pay differences on basis of gender); The Equal Pay Act of 1963, EQUAL EMP’T
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/statutes/epa.cfm [https://
perma.cc/7S7B-TTHU] (last visited Jan. 25, 2020) (providing relevant and perti-
nent excerpts of Equal Pay Act).
9
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the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsi-
bility, and which are performed under similar working condi-
tions.”61  In short, an employer may not use gender as a basis for
paying an employee of one gender less than an employee of a an-
other gender, even though those employees have substantially simi-
lar occupations.62
Today, the Equal Pay Act remains a focus of athletic litigation,
especially in the United States Women’s National Team’s
(USWNT) suit against the United States Soccer Federation (U.S.
Soccer) for equal pay.63  Currently, female players, despite their
great success, are paid $4,950 per game ($99,000 per year), whereas
male players are paid $13,166 per game ($263,320 per year).64  The
women argue a violation of the Equal Pay Act, which prohibits dis-
parity in pay for people of different genders performing substan-
tially similar jobs.65  While their employer argues that the teams had
different collective bargaining agreements, the suit itself exempli-
fies the recent megaphone that the Equal Pay Act can give to
women.66
61. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (listing exceptions to discrimination as seniority sys-
tem; merit system; system based on quality or quantity of production; or pay differ-
ence based on any factor other than sex).
62. See Facts about Equal Pay and Compensation Discrimination, EQUAL EMP’T OP-
PORTUNITY COMM’N, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/fs-epa.cfm [https:/
/perma.cc/35CF-VZQ7] (last visited Feb. 13, 2020) (describing five factors consid-
ered in deciding if two jobs are substantially similar as skill, effort, responsibility,
working conditions, and establishment). See generally 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (codi-
fying federal prohibition on wage differences because of gender discrimination).
63. See Morgan v. U.S. Soccer Fed’n, No. 2:19-cv-01717-RGK-AGR, 2019 WL
7166978, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2019) (alleging violations of Equal Pay Act); see
also Hays, supra note 57 (stating complaint came after long history of women’s R
team demanding equal pay, compensation, and treatment). But see Associated
Press, U.S. Soccer Formally Denies Claims of Gender Discrimination in Response to USWNT,
SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (May 7, 2019), https://www.si.com/soccer/2019/05/07/us-
soccer-uswnt-lawsuit-gender-discrimination-equal-pay-response [https://perma.cc/
8M7A-MZ3Z] (listing U.S. Soccer’s defense arguments that they were acting in ac-
cordance with differences in two collective bargaining agreements and that differ-
ences in salary are due to differences in viewership and revenue).
64. See Hays, supra note 57 (contrasting relatively low pay with team’s vast suc- R
cess, including three World Cup titles, four gold medals, enthusiastic popular
American support, and number one rank in world for ten of past eleven years); see
also Abrams, supra note 55 (noting complaint also included counts of discrimina- R
tion relating to where and how often women play, how they train, and medical and
coaching treatment they receive).
65. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (prohibiting pay disparities unless those dispari-
ties arise in very specific circumstances); Morgan, No. 2:19-CV-01717 at *1 (alleging
employer paid women’s team significantly less than men’s team, but for similar
jobs).
66. See Associated Press, U.S. Soccer Formally Denies Claims of Gender Discrimina-
tion in Response to USWNT, supra note 63 (detailing employer’s allegations were that R
10
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Recently, however, Judge R. Gary Klausner of the United States
District Court for the Central District of California ruled that no
triable issue of fact regarding pay disparity existed in the USWNT
case.67  Even though the women on the team claimed they received
less money, Judge Klausner ruled with U.S. Soccer to find that wo-
men, in fact, made more per game and in total than men.68  Ac-
cording to U.S. Soccer and the court, from 2015 to 2019, the
women’s national team averaged $220,747 per game (in total), for a
total payment of $24.5 million for the season.69  On the other hand,
the men’s national team averaged $212,639 per game (in total), for
a total payment of $18.5 million.70  However, Judge Klausner noted
that if the women had shown that their total compensation was
larger solely, or in material part, because the women’s team works
more than the men’s team, he may have ruled on a triable issue of
fact.71  Consequently, Judge Klausner ruled that the reason for the
alleged pay discrepancy is the collective bargaining agreement that
the women knowingly signed, not gender discrimination.72
USWNT  plans to appeal the decision.73
they treat female team differently for legitimate business reasons and not for any
discriminatory purpose).
67. See Graham Hays, Judge Sides with U.S. Soccer in the USWNT’s Equal Pay Law-
suit, ESPN (May 1, 2020), https://www.espn.com/espnw/sports/story/_/id/
29125363/judge-sides-us-soccer-uswnt-equal-pay-lawsuit [https://perma.cc/7WHJ-
P9MP] (explaining Judge Klausner originally sided with women’s team when they
certified as class action, but found law did not support their claim in long run).
68. See id. (adding players at issue failed to bring forth evidence that proved
any differently); see also Morgan, No. 2:19-cv-01717 at *11-*13 (highlighting how
while women’s team gets paid less in particular bonus category, women get more
bonuses in general, offsetting that particular disparity).
69. See Hays, supra note 67 (noting these figures do not include compensation R
female players receive from U.S. Soccer for playing in National Women’s Soccer
League).
70. See id. (noting these numbers are cited as undisputed facts in Judge
Klausner’s opinion).
71. See Morgan v. United States Soccer Fed’n., 445 F. Supp. 3d 635, 654 (C.D.
Cal. 2020) (“Based on this evidence [salary numbers], it appears that the WNT did
not make more money than the MNT [Men’s National Team] solely because they
played more games. Rather, the WNT [Women’s National Team] both played
more games and made more money than the MNT per game.”); see also Hays, supra
note 67 (noting how holding stated plaintiffs failed to show that discrimination R
could have contributed to pay disparity).
72. See Morgan, 445 F. Supp. 3d at 654 (“Accordingly, Plaintiffs cannot now
retroactively deem their CBA worse than the MNT CBA by reference to what they
would have made had they been paid under the MNT’s pay-to-play structure when
they themselves rejected such a structure.”) (emphasis in original); see also Hays,
supra note 67 (explaining opinion went through detailed explanation of negotia- R
tions that led to players’ current collective bargaining agreement).
73. See USWNT Lawsuit versus U.S. Soccer Explained: Defining the Pay Gaps, What’s
at Stake for Both Sides, ESPN (Jun. 3, 2020), https://www.espn.com/football/united-
states-usaw/story/4071258/uswnt-lawsuit-versus-us-soccer-explained-defining-the-
11
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Despite the negative outcome, many players vowed to keep
fighting for equality.74  Primarily, Megan Rapinoe argues that while
the male and female contracts are different, the two sides were
never offered the same money:
The men’s contract was never offered to us. And certainly
not the same amount of money. So to say that we negoti-
ated for a contract and that’s what we agreed to, I think so
many women can understand what this feeling is going to
a negotiation, knowing equal pay is not on the table.
Knowing anywhere close to your male counterparts is not
on the table.75
Rapinoe is not the only USWNT player avidly speaking out
against the court’s decision.76 Namely, Alex Morgan tweeted “Al-
though disappointing to hear this news, this will not discourage us
in our fight for equality.”77  Additionally, Becky Sauerbrunn
tweeted: “If you know this team at all you know we have a lot of
fight left in us. We knew this wasn’t going to be easy, change never
pay-gapswhats-at-stake-for-both-sides [https://perma.cc/47PB-YMGZ] (adding that
players are starting process to seek permission to appeal court’s decision).
74. See Cassandra Negley, Megan Rapinoe, Alex Morgan Call Equal Pay Ruling







(adding Rapinoe emphasized that issue is rate of pay, not total compensation).
75. See id. (stating judge in case incorrectly concluded that women’s team
only wanted to go to men’s contract because they regretted their own collective
bargaining agreement).
76. See Jason Owens, Megan Rapinoe, USWNT Vow to Move Forward after Losing
Equal Pay Ruling: “We Will Never Stop Fighting”, YAHOO SPORTS (May 1, 2020), https:/
/sports.yahoo.com/megan-rapinoe-on-judges-ruling-against-uswnt-on-equal-pay-
we-will-never-stop-fighting-005317673.html [https://perma.cc/CR22-DRPP] (list-
ing several players who spoke out against court’s ruling).





perma.cc/PL4U-L97X] (reposting her team representative’s statement about dis-
appointment of court ruling).
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is.”78  Clearly, the U.S. Women’s National Team has no intention of
idly accepting Judge Klausner’s ruling.79
B. Yes, Laws Exist to Prevent Gender Discrimination
In addition to the Equal Pay Act, Congress has enacted two
other laws essential to the equal treatment of female athletes.80  In
1964, Congress passed the Civil Rights Act, including Title VII,
which prohibits an employer to commit an adverse action against
an employee “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin . . . .”81  Additionally, in 1972, Congress passed
the Education Amendments, which clarify the Civil Rights Act.82  Ti-
tle IX prohibits public educational institutions from limiting stu-





perma.cc/7VBS-FCGS] (demonstrating women’s team resolve in solving gender
disparity issues).





KRZQ] (“We will continue to fight like hell and get what we deserve.”); Christen




never-stop-fighting-005317673.html [W8W-UQVG] (“We will continue on in the




on-equal-pay-we-will-never-stop-fighting-005317673.html (“We will never stop fight-
ing for EQUALITY.”) (emphasis in original); Tobin Heath (@TobinHeath), TWIT-




673.html (“This team never gives up and we’re not going to start now.”).
80. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1991) (noting prohibitions on gender dis-
crimination in workplace); 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1986) (setting guidelines for pro-
hibition on gender discrimination within federally funded institutions).
81. 20 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (prohibiting employer from depriving employee of
employment opportunities because of race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin); see Kanoy, supra note 58, at 1035-36 (noting Congress added Title IX to edu- R
cation legislation to expand Title VII’s workplace gender protections to students in
schools receiving federal funding).
82. See Overview of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C.A.
§ 1681 et. seq., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Aug. 7, 2015), https://www.justice.gov/crt/
overview-title-ix-education-amendments-1972-20-usc-1681-et-seq [https://
13
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dents’ participation, based on sex, in federally funded activities.83
The regulations state that equal opportunity is defined by several
factors, including accommodating both sexes, the provision of
equipment, the assignment and compensation of coaches and
tutors, and the provision of medical and housing services.84  Even
though Title IX has a broad scope, the statute is often applied in an
athletic context.85
For example, in 2018, two female athletes sued Eastern Michi-
gan University for cutting the female softball and tennis teams that
same year.86  In 2016 to 2017, Eastern Michigan reported that while
sixty percent of enrolled undergraduate students are women, they
comprise only forty-five percent of athletic program participation.87
In the original suit, Judge George Caram Steeh of the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan concluded that
the plaintiffs could likely succeed on the merits of their claim that
Eastern Michigan University’s funding for athletics was substantially
disproportionate.88  Ultimately, after a denied appeal, Judge Steeh
perma.cc/B87E-B5XK] (explaining fundamental purpose of Title IX is to prevent
discrimination based on sex by federally funded institutions).
83. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (listing exceptions to rule, such as religious institu-
tions with contrary tenets and sororities and fraternities that are exempt from
taxation).
84. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (West 2020) (including other factors, such as:
“scheduling of games and practice time; travel and per diem allowance, opportuni-
ties to receive coaching and academic tutoring; the provision of locker rooms,
practice, and competitive facilities; and publicity.”); see also Mayerova v. E. Mich.
Univ., 346 F. Supp. 3d 983, 988 (E.D. Mich. 2018) (setting foundation for follow-
ing legal analysis on whether Title IX violation existed).
85. See Equal Access to Education: Forty Years of Title IX, UNITED STATES DEP’T OF
JUSTICE 1, 10 (2012), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/
2012/06/20/titleixreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/L586-QDZ7] (listing various
cases in early 2000s that upheld educational institutions’ Title IX obligations to
provide equal numbers of women’s and men’s sports teams); see, e.g., Cmtys. for
Equity v. Mich. High School Athletic Ass’n, 459 F.3d 676 (6th Cir. 2006) (ordering
institutional compliance to change female sports schedule to their advantage in-
stead of scheduling their sports at time that was disadvantageous to their potential
for national ranking).
86. See Mayerova, 346 F. Supp. 3d at 986 (explaining school eliminated men’s
wrestling team, men’s swimming and diving team, women’s tennis team, and wo-
men’s softball team); see also Eastern Michigan Pays $125,000 to Settle Title IX Lawsuit,
ASS’D PRESS (Jan. 22, 2020), https://apnews.com/939aff803930dcfd9a4de
3941666fc37 [https://perma.cc/3YTJ-ZW43] (stating tennis team will be rein-
stated while softball team will not exist for foreseeable future).
87. See Eastern Michigan Pays $125,000 to Settle Title IX Lawsuit, supra note 86 R
(demonstrating discrepancy in numbers between male and female athletic
participation).
88. See Mayerova, 346 F. Supp. 3d at 997 (noting defendants did not meet
their burden to show they complied with Title IX requirements).
14
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approved a settlement agreement for $125,000 in total.89  Further,
the school has since hired a Title IX consultant, Anika Awai Wil-
liams.90 The school also agreed to appoint a third party monitor to
ensure that Title IX requirements are met.91  Without Title IX,
plaintiffs like those in the Eastern Michigan University case would
have no legal remedy.92
C. Yes, Pregnant Women Get Little Benefits
Additionally, and most importantly to this Comment, in 1978,
Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA), which
amended Title VII to prohibit employers from discriminating
against women who are, have been, or may be pregnant.93  The
PDA provides, in pertinent part:
The terms ‘because of sex’ or ‘on the basis of sex’ include,
but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of preg-
nancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions; and wo-
men affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-
related purposes . . . .94
Simply put, a pregnant employee may not be treated differ-
ently, in any sense of employment, than any other employee with a
sickness or disability.95  Similarly, the Family Medical Leave Act
89. See Consent Decree, Mayerova v. E. Mich. Univ. (No. 18-CV-11909-GCS-
RSW, E.D. Mich., Jan. 21, 2020), available at https://www.michiganradio.org/sites
/michigan/files/202001/show_temp__2_.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ET9-PNZ8]
(adding also that the university defendants will be paying attorneys’ fees for plain-
tiffs); see also Eastern Michigan Pays $125,000 to Settle Title IX Lawsuit, supra note 86 R
(noting $100,000 of settlement went to softball player while $25,000 of settlement
went to tennis player).
90. See Title IX, E. MICH. UNIV., https://www.emich.edu/title-nine/ [https://
perma.cc/4W8X-LDTP] (last visited Sept. 19, 2020) (outlining Title IX policies at
school).
91. See Consent Decree, Mayerova (appointing “referee” to ensure compliance
with conditions of consent decree); see also Eastern Michigan Pays $125,000 to Settle
Title IX Lawsuit, supra note 86 (highlighting school will put $2 million towards R
women’s sports over next three years).
92. See generally Equal Access to Education: Forty Years of Title IX, supra note 85, at R
9-10 (listing many important cases where athletes used Title IX to seek relief).
93. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1991) (defining officially that pregnancy is con-
sidered sex-linked classification for Title VII liability purposes). See generally Kanoy,
supra note 58, at 1036 (analyzing that because pregnancy is capability unique to R
females, Congress implemented Pregnancy Discrimination Act to ensure that wo-
men would not be discriminated against because of this capability).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (creating non-exhaustive list of characteristics of
pregnancy that are prohibited bases for adverse employment decisions).
95. See Pregnancy Discrimination, EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, https://
www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications/fs-preg.cfm [https://perma.cc/2KK4-5U9N]
15
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(FMLA) provides eligible employees with the opportunity to take
job-protected leave for family and medical reasons, including preg-
nancy.96  Accordingly, employers must hold open a job for a preg-
nancy-related absence for the same amount of time that jobs are
held open for other employees who have been on leave due to sick-
ness or disability.97
Unfortunately, despite the laws created in advancement of gen-
der equality and equality for pregnant women, several issues still
remain regarding how employees who may become pregnant, are
pregnant, or have been pregnant are treated when compared to
their male colleagues.98  Not only are women treated differently be-
cause they could be pregnant, but they are forced to engage in em-
ployment activities that are not safe for their pregnancies.99  For
example, in 2018, a Verizon warehouse employer knew of an em-
ployee’s pregnancy, yet forced her to continue lifting heavy
(last visited Jan. 25, 2020) (stating that health insurance for pregnancy conditions
must be covered in same manner as other conditions).
96. See 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1) (2009) (detailing specific requirements of
leave and employment that constitute eligible employee); see also Fact Sheet #28A:
Employee Protections under the Family Medical Leave Act, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR 1, 1,
https://www.dol.gov/sites/dolgov/files/WHD/legacy/files/whdfs28a.pdf [https:/
/perma.cc/CGB5-HKV3] (last visited Jan. 24, 2020) (explaining employee on
leave is not entitled to exact job they left behind, but equivalent job).
97. See 29 U.S.C. § 2614(a) (2008) (“[A]ny eligible employee who takes leave
under section 2612 of this title for the intended purpose of the leave shall be
entitled, on return from such leave—to be restored by the employer to the posi-
tion of employment held by the employee when the leave commenced; or to be
restored to an equivalent position with equivalent employment benefits, pay, and
other terms and conditions of employment.”); see also Pregnancy Discrimination,
supra note 95 (noting employer may not subject pregnant women to different in- R
surance or medical procedures than other employees).
98. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Natalie Kitroeff, Miscarrying at Work: The
Physical Toll of Pregnancy Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2018), https://www.ny
times.com/interactive/2018/10/21/business/pregnancy-discrimination-miscar
riages.html [https://perma.cc/KDM4-UH58] (“Pregnancy discrimination is wide-
spread in corporate America. Some employers deny expecting mothers promo-
tions or pay raises; others fire them before they can take maternity leave. But for
women who work in physically demanding jobs, pregnancy discrimination often
can come with even higher stakes.”); see also Liz Elting, Why Pregnancy Discrimination
Still Matters, FORBES MAGAZINE (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/
lizelting/2018/10/30/why-pregnancy-discrimination-still-matters/#3a807c7563c1
[https://perma.cc/BGQ9-7ZJ2] (discussing sad reality that since passage of PDA,
pregnancy discrimination is only more subtle).
99. See Silver-Greenberg & Kitroeff, supra note 98 (detailing story that Verizon R
forced their pregnant workers to hoist heavy boxes all day until one employee
eventually lost her baby).
16
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boxes.100  Consequently, the employee tragically and graphically
lost her baby due to the forced physical exercise.101
More specifically, athletics, both professional and amateur,
have struggled to treat female athletes fairly with respect to poten-
tial or existing pregnancies.102  For example, Nike recently de-
nounced their own pregnancy policy when track and field
Olympians Alysia Montaño, Kara Goucher, and Allyson Felix re-
vealed that Nike did not guarantee employee protection for preg-
nant athletes or new mothers.103  Originally, Nike would reduce
100. See id. (stating multiple other women suffered from miscarriages); see also
Natalie Kitroeff, Senators Ask Verizon and XPO about Pregnancy Discrimination, N.Y.
TIMES (Nov. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/20/business/xpo-ver-
izon-pregnancy-discrimination-miscarriages.html [https://perma.cc/SAA6-GFK9]
(discussing nine senators who demanded explanation for several women who ex-
perienced miscarriage at workplace).
101. See Silver-Greenberg & Kitroeff, supra note 98 (noting this tragic story is R
small part of large issue of pregnancy discrimination); see also Kitroeff, supra note
100 (explaining XPO and Verizon claimed causes of miscarriages were unsubstan- R
tiated and were not related to warehouse operations).  Further, unlike the female
athletes discussed earlier, who made an informed decision to continue exercising,
Verizon and XPO blatantly ignored their employees’ doctors’ notes imploring for
shorter and less strenuous shifts. See generally Maggie Mertens, Maternity Leave—Not
Higher Pay—Is the WNBA’s Real Win, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 1, 2020), https://www.the
atlantic.com/culture/archive/2020/02/why-wnbas-new-maternity-leave-policy-rev-
olutionary/605944/ [https://perma.cc/ZQB9-9NB6] (noting some physiological
effects of being pregnant could have positive impact on athletic performance).
Compare New York Times, What Nike Told Me When I Wanted to Have a Baby, YOUTUBE
(May 13, 2019), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vyvhKDHsWRE [https://
perma.cc/JY49-GYBJ] (noting health benefits, both for baby and mother, of exer-
cising through pregnancy), with Silver-Greenberg & Kitroeff, supra note 98 R
(describing how employers blatantly ignored doctors’ notes demanding less taxing
tasks at work).
102. See, e.g., Jenna West, Athletes Speak out against Nike’s Lack of Maternity Leave
Protection, Other Companies Make Change, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (May 24, 2019),
https://www.si.com/olympics/2019/05/24/nike-maternity-protection-sponsor-
ships-contract-allyson-felix-alysia-montano [https://perma.cc/7L2T-Y4K6] (dis-
cussing Nike’s unattainable standards regarding pregnant athletes, including utter
lack of paid maternity leave). See generally Issues Related to Pregnancy & Athletic Par-
ticipation, supra note 26 (addressing questions related to pregnancy discrimination R
in athletics, such as, “Should a coach or an athletic trainer prohibit a pregnant
female athlete from competing out of concern for her safety?”).
103. See Chris Chavez, Nike Removes Contract Reductions for Pregnant Athletes after
Backlash, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Aug. 16, 2019), https://www.si.com/olympics/
2019/08/16/nike-contract-reduction-pregnancy-protection-athlete-maternity-leave
[https://perma.cc/LNP4-Z54J] (discussing Felix left her relationship with Nike to
work for Athleta, company that guaranteed compensation during pregnancy and
pregnancy recovery); see also Jenna West, Allyson Felix: Nike Contract Talks at ‘Stand-
still’ after Request for Maternity Protections, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (May 22, 2019),
https://www.si.com/olympics/2019/05/22/allyson-felix-nike-contract-maternity-
protection [https://perma.cc/EH72-GSCR] (“Last year we [Nike] standardized
our approach across all sports to support our female athlete during pregnancy, but
we recognize we can go even further. . . . [M]oving forward, our contracts for
female athletes will include written terms that reinforce our policy.”); West, supra
17
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pay—seventy percent less, in Felix’s case—or even completely stop
pay because female athletes could not perform to Nike’s standards
during their pregnancies.104  Nike’s stance only perpetuated the no-
tion that a female athlete cannot be both a mother and a competi-
tive athlete.105  Montaño, an Olympic track athlete, released an
opinion piece with The New York Times, exposing Nike for failure to
balance a woman’s role as pregnant, a professional athlete, and an
engaged mother.106  When Montaño told Nike that she was preg-
nant, they told her that they would simply pause her contract and
stop paying her as long as she could not compete due to preg-
nancy.107  This is especially problematic for track and field athletes
whose careers depend on athletic sponsorships.108  Montaño
note 102 (adding disclosure of this information violated arguably problematic non- R
disclosure agreement).
104. See Cassandra Brumback, ‘Just Do It’: Allyson Felix, Nike, and the Path to-
wards Ending Pregnancy Discrimination in Professional Athletic Contracts, UNIV. OF BALT.
L. REV.: BLOG (Oct. 18, 2019), https://ubaltlawreview.com/2019/10/18/just-do-it-
allyson-felix-nike-and-the-path-towards-ending-pregnancy-discrimination-in-profes-
sional-athletic-contracts/ [https://perma.cc/SP5S-DHR8] (adding that Nike’s of-
fer to pay Felix 70% less of her current salary caused her to leave company and
join sponsorship with Athleta); see also New York Times, supra note 101 (highlight- R
ing Nike’s contracts contained clause stating Nike reserved right to eliminate pay
at any time if athlete did not meet certain performance threshold, with no excep-
tions for childbirth, nursing, or pregnancy); Nick Turner & Eben Novy-Williams,
Nike to Limit Pay Cuts for Women Athletes who have Children, BLOOMBERG (May 24,
2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-24/nike-to-limit-pay-
cuts-for-women-athletes-who-have-children [https://perma.cc/JH4F-WFGD] (not-
ing another Olympic athlete, Phoebe Wright, said getting pregnant while working
for Nike was “kiss of death.”). See generally Suzanne Wrack, Alex Morgan Shows Preg-
nancy Does Not End a Playing Career, GUARDIAN (Feb. 10, 2020), https://
www.theguardian.com/football/2020/feb/10/alex-morgan-pregnancy-usa-
womens-football [https://perma.cc/A9XC-PHKL] (listing other pregnant athletes
who performed through their pregnancies, like Ingrid Kristiansen, who won Hous-
ton Marathon while pregnant and Paula Radcliffe, who won New York marathon
nine months after giving birth); Alex Morgan (@alexmorgan13), TWITTER (Feb. 3,
2020, 7:05 PM), https://twitter.com/alexmorgan13/status/
1224484038770999296?s=20%20training (tweeting video of Alex Morgan after
scoring goal while seven months pregnant).
105. See Kanoy, supra note 58, at 1042 (stating how putting this idea into pub- R
lic eye promotes public misconception that professional female athletes must give
up everything to attain their employment dreams).
106. See New York Times, supra note 101 (“The sports industry allows for men R
to have a full career. And when a woman decides to have a baby, it pushes them
out at their prime.”); see also West, supra note 102 (celebrating Montaño for bring- R
ing to light prominent issue that people should know and care about, but did not
before Montaño used her voice).
107. See New York Times, supra note 101 (adding United States Olympic Com- R
mittee will strip athletes of their health insurance if they do not stay “at the top of
[their] game” during their pregnancy).
108. See West, supra note 102 (emphasizing Olympic track athletes’ reliance R
on checks from sponsors like Nike and Asics); Mary Pilon, Cash-Strapped Track and
Field Athletes Still Fighting to Unionize, VICE (July 15, 2016), https://www.vice.com/
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promptly proved the doubters wrong by competing while seven to
eight months pregnant and returning to peak form almost immedi-
ately after giving birth.109  Her maternal skills did not suffer either;
during the World Championships in Beijing, she shipped
breastmilk off to the states.110  More importantly, Montaño’s story
enlightened many on the issues surrounding athletes who are not
associated with a team.111  For Montaño, her moderate popularity,
compounded with pregnancy discrimination, ultimately punished
her for wanting to get pregnant, since she was not paid while she
gave birth and recovered.112
The tide grew stronger when, about one month later, Felix
bravely broke her own nondisclosure agreement and wrote an opin-
ion editorial piece for The New York Times.113  Despite her decorated
athletic and Olympic history, Felix felt pressured to return to peak
form shortly after she gave birth, even though she underwent an
emergency and premature C-section due to dangerous pre-eclamp-
sia.114  With such an outcry, Congressional Representatives Jaime
Herrera Beutler of Washington  and Lucille Roybal-Allard of Cali-
en_us/article/yp8pwg/the-continuing-fight-of-track-and-field-athletes-to-unionize
[https://perma.cc/MAY2-GCZN] (discussing lack of lucrative gain in track and
field stems from no track and field union and from low amounts of television reve-
nue in sport).
109. See West, supra note 102 (adding after Montaño threatened to leave Nike R
for Asics, Asics could not guarantee pay protection during Montaño’s pregnancy
either); see also New York Times, supra note 101 (coining Montaño’s nickname as R
“pregnant runner”).
110. See New York Times, supra note 101 (showing no indication of failing in R
either maternal respect or athletic respect of Montaño’s life); see, e.g., Wrack, supra
note 104 (“The Morgan phenomenon - the celebrating of the pregnant athlete, is R
a new thing and it has taken global poster-woman such as Morgan, an eight-weeks
pregnant Serena Williams revealing her pregnancy after winning the 2017 Austra-
lian Open and images of five-and-a-half-month pregnant Orlando Pride forward
Sydney Leroux training, coupled with a much greater awareness of the benefits of
exercise during pregnancy in society generally, to break the stigma.”); see also West,
supra note 107 (noting how Montaño, to meet demands of her contract, had to R
tape her abs together to compete).
111. See West, supra note 107 (epitomizing issue with statement by Phoebe R
Wright, Olympian, stating that she would never tell Nike if she was pregnant).
112. See id. (summarizing importance of Montaño stepping forward to bring
light to unknown issues in track and field); see also New York Times, supra note 101 R
(outlining difficulties and barriers female athletes face when they want to become
pregnant).
113. See Allyson Felix, Allyson Felix: My Own Nike Pregnancy Story, N.Y. TIMES
(May 22, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/22/opinion/allyson-felix-
pregnancy-nike.html [https://perma.cc/8J2J-QSH5] (“I’ve always known that ex-
pressing myself could hurt my career. I’ve tried not to show emotion, to anticipate
what people can expect from me and to do it. I don’t like to let people down. But
you can’t change anything with silence.”).
114. See id. (adding that she is one of most decorated athletes in history with
six Olympic gold medals and eleven world championships).
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fornia wrote a bipartisan letter to Mark Parker, chairman, presi-
dent, and CEO of Nike, imploring him to hold himself and his
company accountable.115  Two months later, Nike eliminated the
pay reduction policy to implement a new policy that would protect
female athletes’ pay for twelve months during the pregnancy expe-
rience.116  The new contract states:
If ATHLETE becomes pregnant, NIKE may not apply any
performance-related reductions (if any) for a consecutive
period of 18 [sic] months, beginning eight months prior
to ATHLETE’s due date. During such period NIKE may
not apply any right of termination (if any) as a result of
ATHLETE not competing due to pregnancy.117
Despite the ostensible progress on the contractual front, both
professional and amateur athletes struggle to protect themselves
from another discriminatory violation: the forced pregnancy test.118
III. “HOW CAN THIS CHANGE?”: A FOURTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
OF PREGNANCY TESTS
Since discrimination laws fail to adequately protect female ath-
letes from employer intrusion, the Fourth Amendment’s protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures presents another reme-
115. See Letter from Rep. Jaime Herrera Beutler and Rep. Lucille Roybal-Al-
lard, United States Congress, to Mark Parker, Chairman, President, CEO, Nike,
Inc. (May 17, 2019), https://herrerabeutler.house.gov/uploadedfiles/
05_17_19_letter_to_nike.pdf (“[W]e strongly urge you to hold Nike accountable to
its own self-proclaimed principles of integrity and fair treatment of female athletes
at every stage of their careers—from the time they are young girls to the time they
choose to simultaneously bear the title of athlete and mother.”).
116. See Turner & Novy-Williams, supra note 104 (noting Nike’s executive ad- R
ministration is aiming to get these policies in writing for athletic contracts); see also
Charlotte Carroll, Nike to End Financial Penalties for Pregnant Athletes after Backlash on
Contract Protections, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (May 25, 2019), https://www.si.com/olym-
pics/2019/05/25/nike-end-financial-penalties-pregnant-athletes-contracts-mater-
nity-protection [https://perma.cc/BSV6-CYUF] (noting that after changes were
made, Nike issued statement that interactions with Olympic athletes were “hum-
bling moment[s]”).
117. Emmanuel Acho (@thEMANacho), TWITTER, (Aug. 16, 2019, 10:27 AM),
https://twitter.com/thEMANacho/status/1162370385461043211 (adding “Wow.
HUGE progress for female athletes, and quality in general! @Nike, officially elimi-
nating wage deductions due to pregnancy (for track & field athletes). Effective
immediately!”); see also Chavez, supra note 103 (noting Nike has yet to decide R
whether suspension based on not competing for certain period of time will still
apply).
118. For further discussion on legal and social context surrounding forced
pregnancy tests, see infra notes 188-245 and accompanying text. R
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dial avenue for women.119  The Fourth Amendment of the United
States Constitution states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affir-
mation, and particularly describing the place to be search,
and the persons or things to be seized.120
Pregnancy tests are undoubtedly searches under the Fourth
Amendment.121  Consequently, courts must take it upon themselves
to find forced pregnancy tests unreasonable searches and thus,
unconstitutional.122
This section discusses the development of caselaw regarding
forced pregnancy tests in the workplace and in school and how
those tests are correctly or incorrectly analyzed under the Fourth
Amendment.123  First, this section discusses the applicability of con-
stitutional privacy rights to the private employee.124  Then, this sec-
tion provides a background on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence,
specifically regarding the caselaw analysis towards unreasonable
searches.125  Next, the section discusses a series of cases that have
addressed forced pregnancy tests under the Fourth Amendment
119. See generally What Does the Fourth Amendment Mean?, U.S. COURTS, https://
www.uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/educational-resources/about-educational-
outreach/activity-resources/what-does-0 [https://perma.cc/DD46-63PK] (last vis-
ited Sept. 21, 2020) (demonstrating environments impacted by Fourth Amend-
ment’s far-reaching jurisdictions).
120. U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added) (protecting American citizens
from unnecessary government intrusion).
121. See Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 300 (3d Cir. 2000) (agreeing with
district court’s finding that pregnancy test is clearly search); see also John T.
Wolohan, Testing Students Athletes for Drugs Remains a Challenge, ATHLETIC BUS. (Feb.
2001), https://www.athleticbusiness.com/testing-student-athletes-for-drugs-re-
mains-a-challenge.html [https://perma.cc/ABL3-D9DR] (reiterating “reasonable-
ness” under Fourth Amendment depends on privacy expectations of student,
nature of intrusion, and legitimacy of government’s concern).
122. See, e.g., Gruenke, 225 F.3d (demonstrating courts’ capacity to eliminate
unnecessary pregnancy tests in high schools).  For further discussion on Fourth
Amendment analysis surrounding forced pregnancy tests, see infra notes 188-245 R
and accompanying text.
123. For further discussion on caselaw addressing forced pregnancy tests, see
infra notes 188-245 and accompanying text. R
124. For further discussion on interplay of U.S. Constitution, state constitu-
tions, and public and private employees, see infra notes 128-145 and accompanying R
text.
125. For further discussion on caselaw addressing broader implications of
Fourth Amendment analysis, see infra notes 146-251 and accompanying text. R
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analysis, with a focus on the workplace and high school athletics.126
Finally, this section addresses how courts can use Fourth Amend-
ment analysis to ban forced pregnancy tests in athletics, unless
there are stringent circumstances at hand.127
A. Are Privacy Rights Only for Public Employees?
Public schools and government employers are undoubtedly
subject to constitutional privacy requirements because the Constitu-
tion is intended to protect citizens from the government violating
their civil rights.128  Generally, private employees do not have con-
stitutional rights to privacy when they feel an invasion on personal
property.129  However, when a private employer invades an em-
ployee’s privacy by violating a state constitution, the violated em-
ployee may have a cause of action.130
For example, in Hill v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n,131 the Su-
preme Court of California compared the National Collegiate Ath-
letic Association’s (NCAA) drug testing policy against the
established privacy right in the California Constitution.132  After ac-
knowledging that the NCAA is a nongovernmental, private entity,
126. For further discussion on Fourth Amendment jurisprudence regarding
forced pregnancy tests in workplace and in high school athletics, see infra notes
188-245 and accompanying text. R
127. For further discussion on need to use Fourth Amendment analysis to
eliminate forced pregnancy tests, see infra notes 246-302 and accompanying text. R
128. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) (emphasizing impor-
tance of holding public schools constitutionally accountable); see, e.g., Ascolese v.
Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 925 F. Supp. 351, 355 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (engaging in constitu-
tional analysis regarding government-run public transportation business). See gen-
erally Can Bosses Do That? As It Turns Out, Yes They Can, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Jan. 29,
2010), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=123024596
[https://perma.cc/88D6-QEDH] (noting free speech constitutional law is only ap-
plicable when government is involved); Our Government: The Constitution, WHITE
HOUSE, https://www.whitehouse.gov/about-the-white-house/the-constitution/
[https://perma.cc/GG2R-6Q2D] (last visited June 10, 2020) (explaining funda-
mental purpose of United States Constitution).
129. See generally Can Bosses Do That? As It Turns Out, Yes They Can, supra note
128 (quoting author Lewis Maltby in saying that Constitution does not apply to R
private corporations at all).
130. See WILLIAM E. HARTSFIELD, INVESTIGATING EMPLOYEE CONDUCT §13:3,
Westlaw (databased updated Sept. 2020) (providing violation of privacy as example
for when private employer may violate state constitution).
131. 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994) (emphasizing athletes’ inherent state-given
rights).
132. See id. at 641 (adding that article I, section 1 of California Constitution
states that “[a]ll people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable
rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, pos-
sessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness,
and privacy”) (emphasis in original).
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the court stated that the California Constitution protects citizens
from all invasions of privacy.133  In fact, during the public argument
over whether to include a privacy right in the constitution, one
commenter posited that “[t]he right of privacy . . . prevents govern-
ment and business interests from collecting and stockpiling unnec-
essary information about us and from misusing information
gathered for one purpose in order to serve other purposes or to
embarrass us.”134  However, the court did point out that the legal
analysis may be different when comparing a private actor violation
to a governmental violation.135  Regardless, while the court did not
ultimately find that the athletes’ privacy rights were violated, the
opinion makes clear that the California Constitution provides a
right to privacy against private entities.136
Additionally, in York v. Wahkiakum Sch. Dist. No. 200,137 the Su-
preme Court of Washington found a school’s suspicion-less drug
testing of student-athletes to be unconstitutional.138  Even though
the school district at issue in York is a public district, the court fo-
cused on article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution,
which provides that no resident’s privacy shall be invaded.139  The
court underwent a state constitutional analysis because “[i]t is well
established that in some areas, article I, section 7 provides greater
protection than its federal counterpart—the Fourth Amend-
133. See id. (highlighting how constitution does not only protect against gov-
ernment actions).
134. Id. at 642 (alteration in original) (noting privacy initiative was directed at
preventing businesses and governments alike from collecting too much unneces-
sary information).
135. See id. at 656 (stating largest differences between private employees and
public employers are (1) government is inherently more coercive than private cor-
poration, and (2) individual has more choices when dealing with private actor
than when dealing with government entity); see also Sheehan v. S.F. 49ers, Ltd., 201
P.3d 472, 477 (Cal. 2009) (acknowledging ultimately private right of action availa-
ble to California state residents who feel that their state constitutional rights have
been violated).
136. See Hill, 865 P.2d at 669 (reversing court of appeals’ permanent injunc-
tion against NCAA’s drug testing policy); see also Sheehan, 201 P.3d at 477 (explain-
ing that, similar to U.S. Constitution argument, defendant can prevail in state
constitution case by showing invasion of privacy furthers more important inter-
ests).  But see Miller v. Safeway, Inc., 102 P.3d 282, 296 (Alaska 2002) (finding
claimant does not have constitutional rights unless state action was involved).
137. 178 P.3d 995 (Wash. 2008) (reversing lower court’s decision that drug
test was constitutional).
138. See id. at 1006 (emphasizing privacy rights Washington State Constitution
gives to Washington residents).
139. See WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7 (“No person shall be disturbed in his private
affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.”); York, 178 P.3d at 1001
(choosing to undergo Washington State Constitution analysis rather than analysis
under Fourth Amendment).
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ment.”140  After engaging in the Katz constitutional analysis, the
court found that the school at issue had no legitimate interest in
randomly implementing suspicion-less drug testing on athletes.141
The court ultimately found the Washington State Constitution pro-
tected student-athletes from random drug testing.142
Unfortunately, only eleven states have a right to privacy, and
those states do not specify whether state action must be involved for
a citizen to have that right to privacy.143  Therefore, for employees
like Alysia Montaño and Allyson Felix, rights can only be vindicated
by the rare and applicable state constitution or by the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act.144  Hopefully, momentum on privacy rights
against private actors builds throughout the country and violated
employees can find remedy in those laws.145
B. Yes, the Fourth Amendment is More than Criminal Law
On a broader scale, a Fourth Amendment search involves both
an invasion of property and an attempt to glean information from
that invasion.146  With the growth of technology, the idea of what
constitutes a “physical intrusion” has more broadly evolved.147  In
140. York, 178 P.3d at 1001 (citing State v. McKinney, 60 P.3d 46 (2002); State
v. Myrick, 688 P.2d 151 (1984)) (adding court will look to prior interpretations of
state constitution in particular context to decide whether state constitution does
afford greater protection than Fourth Amendment).
141. See id. at 1003 (finding state constitution does not authorize school to
conduct suspicion-less testing).
142. See id. at 1005 (noting school cannot conduct drug tests unless they have
at least reasonable suspicion).
143. See Privacy Protections in State Constitutions, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (May 11, 2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunica-
tions-and-information-technology/privacy-protections-in-state-constitutions.aspx
[https://perma.cc/S6FK-ANVF] (listing states that have explicit right to privacy as
Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana, New
Hampshire, South Carolina, and Washington).
144. For further discussion on issues facing employees who are forced to have
pregnancy tests or who are treated differently because of their pregnancy status,
see infra notes 188-223 and accompanying text. R
145. See Mitchell Noordyke, US State Comprehensive Privacy Law Comparison,
INT’L ASS’N. FOR PRIVACY PROF’LS., https://iapp.org/resources/article/state-com-
parison-table/ [https://perma.cc/L33Y-VXHJ] (last visited June 10, 2020) (noting
state momentum for passing larger privacy bills is at “all-time high”).
146. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404-11 (2012) (finding at-
taching GPS to government vehicle constituted search under Fourth Amend-
ment); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (finding thermal imaging of
home is considered search under Fourth Amendment).
147. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 405-07 (quoting United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S.
276, 286 (1983)) (analyzing that while Fourth Amendment analysis originally re-
lied on presence of literal physical intrusion, Katz’s finding that Fourth Amend-
ment “protects people, not places” evinces expansion of such strict interpretation);
Peter Winn, Katz and the Origins of the “Reasonable Expectation of Privacy” Test, Com-
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fact, Katz v. United States148 effectively overturned the strict “trespass
doctrine” presented in Olmstead v. United States,149 which required
penetration of a physical area to have a Fourth Amendment viola-
tion.150  The Supreme Court further defined the contours of this
expansion in Kyllo v. United States,151 where the Court contemplated
the constitutional implications of police officers using a thermal
imaging tool to gain information about the defendant’s home.152
In Kyllo, the Court posited that the Fourth Amendment can only
logically evolve in parallel with twentieth century technology.153
Consequently, the new rule is “that obtaining by sense-enhancing
technology any information regarding the interior of the home that
could not otherwise have been obtained without physical ‘intrusion into a
constitutionally protected area,’ constitutes a search.”154  The caveat to
this rule is that the Court only vaguely limited the rule to circum-
stances where “the technology in question is not in general public
use.”155
The rules solidified in 1967, with two seminal Supreme Court
cases on the Fourth Amendment.156  First, Camara v. Mun. Court of
ment, 40 MCGEORGE L. REV. 1, 9 (2009) (“By explicitly basing the protections of
the Fourth Amendment on a right of privacy, the test gave courts more flexibility
to protect a broader concept of human dignity at a time when information tech-
nology had outstripped what property rights alone could protect.”); see also Nican-
dro Iannacci, Katz v. United States: The Fourth Amendment Adapts to New Technology,
CONSTITUTION CENTER (Dec. 18, 2018), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/katz-
v-united-states-the-fourth-amendment-adapts-to-new-technology [https://
perma.cc/B6DU-DYUV] (discussing modern technological implications of Katz ex-
plicitly overturning stricter “trespass doctrine”).
148. 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967) (clarifying right to be free from unreasonable
searches and seizures should not be considered general right to privacy).
149. 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (holding Fourth Amendment does not protect
against placement of telephone wires and calls that occur over these wires).
150. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (“We conclude that the underpinnings of Olm-
stead and Goldman have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the
‘trespass’ doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling.”).
151. 533 U.S. 27 (2001) (finding use of sense-enhancing technology to gain
information about defendant’s home is search under Fourth Amendment).
152. See id. at 29-30 (detailing facts of case where police officers used thermal
imaging to try to confirm their suspicions that defendant was growing marijuana
with heat lamps inside his home).
153. See id. at 35 (finding law needs to fall in line with technological
developments).
154. Id. (emphasis added) (“To withdraw protection of this minimum expec-
tation would be to permit police technology to erode the privacy guaranteed by
the Fourth Amendment.” (citing Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505, 512
(1961))).
155. See id. at 35 (discussing limiting definition of search to obtaining per-
sonal details is inconsistent with purpose of Fourth Amendment).
156. See Camara v. Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (hold-
ing routine administrative searches in non-criminal context cannot be conducted
25
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San Francisco157 explored the constitutionality of a routine adminis-
trative search by the Division of Housing Inspection in San Fran-
cisco.158  The Supreme Court found that, even in routine searches,
the right to be free from unreasonable government invasions re-
mained essential to American freedom.159  Second, Katz developed
a two-part test for determining whether a search or seizure is rea-
sonable under the Fourth Amendment.160
The Court builds a foundation for its new test by simply stating:
“[t]he Fourth Amendment protects people, not places.  What a per-
son knowingly exposes to the public, even in his home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”161  While the ma-
jority holds that listening to someone’s conversation without their
consent violates the Constitution, the definitive “unreasonable
search” test originated in Justice Harlan’s concurrence.162  Accord-
ing to Justice Harlan, the unreasonable search test has “a twofold
requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjec-
tive) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be
one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”163  Thus,
the test employs both subjective and objective elements of privacy
expectations.164
without consent or warrant); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (holding
recording oral statement constitutes unreasonable search and/or seizure under
Fourth Amendment).
157. 387 U.S. at 528 (finding purpose of Fourth Amendment is to protect
Americans from unreasonable invasions by government).
158. See id. (indicating Fourth Amendment provides protection that is funda-
mental to free society).
159. See id. (finding few exceptions to Fourth Amendment’s baseline warrant
requirement).
160. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351-52 (reframing constitutional test to focus on
constitutional rights of petitioner, rather than constitutional rights attached to cer-
tain location).
161. Id. at 351 (citing Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966)) (not-
ing what someone seeks to be protected may be subject to constitutional
safeguards).
162. See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 12 (2013) (Kagan, J., concurring)
(demonstrating majority and concurrence’s reliance on test presented in Katz);
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 405-08 (2012) (finding Katz test is guiding
principle, but not exclusive test for deciding reasonableness of governmental in-
trusions); Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32-33 (2001) (using Katz test as guid-
ing framework, but not strict analytical formula, for deciding on reasonableness of
search).
163. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (“Thus a man’s home is, for most purposes, a place
where he expects privacy. . . . [O]n the other hand, conversations in the open
would not be protected against being overheard, for the expectation of privacy
under the circumstances would be unreasonable.”).
164. See Winn, supra note 147, at 11 (dissecting litigious viability of subjective R
and objective prongs presented in Justice Harlan’s concurrence); see also Katz, 389
U.S. at 361 (implying, through analysis, that prongs presented were both objective
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Even though Katz and subsequent cases primarily encounter
issues of governmental intrusion on physical property, little caselaw
and scholarship indicates that the Katz test only applies to prop-
erty.165  In fact, the Court in United States v. Jones166 explicitly stated
that “Katz did not narrow the Fourth Amendment’s scope.”167  In
her concurrence, Justice Sotomayor commented: “Of course, the
Fourth Amendment is not concerned only with trespassory intrusions on
property.  Rather, even in the absence of a trespass, ‘a Fourth Amend-
ment search occurs when the government violates a subjective ex-
pectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable.’”168
Additionally, lower courts have applied Justice Harlan’s “unreasona-
ble search” test.169
C. Yes, Student-Athletes are Forced to Take Pregnancy Tests
Despite the recent strides taken in the athletic field for female
equality, there is no definitive rule on the constitutionality of re-
quiring student-athletes to take pregnancy tests.170  As a baseline,
courts have overwhelmingly found that a pregnancy test constitutes
and subjective); Iannacci, supra note 147 (interpreting Justice Harlan’s concur- R
rence to articulate two part test, including both subjective and objective prong).
165. See Jones, 565 U.S. at 408 (finding while expectations of privacy could rely
on real property principles, Fourth Amendment is not limited to those principles
and privacy can be defined in any manner that society sees fit).
166. 565 U.S. 400 (finding warrantless placement of GPS on government car
constituted unreasonable search under Fourth Amendment).
167. Id. at 408-09 (explaining other evolutionary steps Fourth Amendment
analysis has taken in twenty first century). See generally Daniel T. Pesciotta, Com-
ment, I’m Not Dead Yet: Katz, Jones, and the Fourth Amendment in the 21st Century, 63
CASE W. L. REV. 187, 289 n.4 (2012) (noting Katz Court explicitly stated that Katz
test was expansion, not limitation, of Fourth Amendment, by reasoning that
Fourth Amendment protects people, not particular places).
168. Jones, 565 U.S. at 414 (emphasis added) (discussing Court in Katz noted
that there does not need to be physical intrusion to find Fourth Amendment
violation).
169. See Brian H. Bornstein, Pregnancy, Drug Testing, and the Fourth Amendment:
Legal and Behavioral Implications, 17 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 188, 221 (2003) (exemplifying
Justice Harlan’s two-part analysis through Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S.
67 (2001)); Pesciotta, supra note 167, at 210 (discussing lower court’s application R
of Justice Harlan’s request); see, e.g., Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 78 (describing balanc-
ing test that is necessary to decide Fourth Amendment cases); United States v.
Nerber, 222 F.3d 597 (9th Cir. 2000) (using “unreasonable search” test to find that
installing video cameras in someone’s hotel room is violation of their reasonable
expectations of privacy); United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1984) (us-
ing “unreasonable search” test to determine constitutionality of installing surveil-
lance cameras in apartment of several terrorist suspects).
170. For further discussion on constitutionality of requiring pregnancy tests,
both in athletic and non-athletic settings, see infra notes 246-251 and accompany- R
ing text.
27
Rogers: Can I Have Some Privacy?: A Look Into the Unfortunate Truth Of Pr
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository,
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\28-1\VLS105.txt unknown Seq: 28  4-JAN-21 11:50
198 JEFFREY S. MOORAD SPORTS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 28: p. 171
a search under the Fourth Amendment.171  Moving forward, the
reasonableness of the search is essential in determining its
constitutionality.172
Reasonableness, in the context of a school-mandated preg-
nancy test, is determined by balancing the nature of the student’s
privacy interest with that of the government’s interest in con-
ducting the search, all while taking into account the nature of the
intrusion.173  Often, a high school student’s subjective expectation
of privacy is considered to be lower than the average adult.174  Stu-
dents are subjected to multiple physical examinations, some locker
or backpack searches, and various other medical tests.175  More spe-
cifically, student-athletes have an even lower expectation of privacy
because, by going out for the team, they agree to interactions in
public locker rooms and additional physical and personal exams.176
Because these athletes volunteer to participate on school teams,
their expectations of privacy are lower than the average person.177
171. See, e.g., Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding preg-
nancy test constitutes search under Fourth Amendment); Norman-Bloodsaw v.
Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d 1260, 1269 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding pregnancy
tests are searches and, therefore, have Fourth Amendment implications); Ascolese
v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 925 F. Supp. 351, 364 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (upholding plain-
tiff’s argument that pregnancy test is search under Fourth Amendment).
172. See, e.g., Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 300 (outlining reasoning by noting since
pregnancy test is clearly search, the next step in inquiry is to decide whether search
was reasonable).
173. See id. at 301 (following three-part analysis where expectations of privacy,
nature of intrusion, and interests of government are considered); see, e.g., Del. v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979) (“Thus, the permissibility of a particular law en-
forcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual’s Fourth
Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate government interests.”);
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652-53 (1995) (holding “ultimate
measure” of constitutionality of governmental search is reasonableness).
174. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654-57 (discussing jurisprudence behind finding
that high school students have lower expectation of privacy); New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 348 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring) (“In any realistic sense, students
within the school environment have a lesser expectation of privacy than members
of the population generally.”).
175. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656 (adding also that some of these examina-
tions and vaccinations are mandated by school); see, e.g., Mary Ellen Flannery, The
High Cost of Random Student Searches, NEA TODAY (Dec. 14, 2017), http://neatoday.
org/2017/12/14/the-high-cost-of-random-student-searches/ [https://perma.cc/
M84L-H6JL] (explaining random searches for weapons in urban schools contrib-
ute to school-to-prison pipeline).
176. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 657 (“Somewhat like adults who choose to par-
ticipate in a ‘closely regulated industry,’ students who voluntarily participate in
school athletics have reason to expect intrusions upon normal rights and privi-
leges, including privacy.”).
177. See id. (detailing students’ lowered expectations of privacy).
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When considering the reasonableness of the intrusion, how-
ever, the fact that athletes have a lower expectation of privacy does
not mean that they have no expectation of privacy.178  At the very
least, students have a Fourth Amendment right to be free from un-
reasonable searches, just as every other American has this right.179
However, when a school is attempting to maintain a consistently
safe environment, getting a warrant or having probable cause is an
unrealistic expectation of schools.180  The Supreme Court and
lower courts have decided on a general rule that when searches are
performed as part of a regulatory program, courts will decide on
the constitutionality of the search by conducting a “special needs”
analysis.181  The special needs analysis balances the needs of the
government in conducting the search with the privacy interests of
the person subject to the search.182  More specifically, the original
intent of the special needs exception is to apply it in “[o]nly . . .
those exceptional circumstances in which special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable
cause requirement [of the Fourth Amendment] impracticable . . . a
court [is then] entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for
that of the Framers.”183
In most cases where students are tested for drugs or searched
without warning, the court acknowledges the evident need for
schools to maintain a safe environment.184  On the contrary, when
178. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 338 (noting there are few situations so dire that
could completely eliminate student’s legitimate expectation of privacy).
179. See Kate R. Ehlenberger, The Right to Search Students, EDUCATIONAL LEAD-
ERSHIP, Dec. 2001/Jan. 2002, at 31, http://www.ascd.org/publications/educa-
tional-leadership/dec01/vol59/num04/The-Right-to-Search-Students.aspx
[https://perma.cc/W6S5-U6JH] (informing parents and students that children in
schools cannot be subject to unreasonable searches, despite dangerous incidents
that have recently occurred in schools).
180. See T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 352 (arguing safety is of utmost importance be-
cause, at very least, unsafe environment prevents teachers from effectively teach-
ing); Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653 (noting how requiring probable cause in schools is
impracticable and does not meet government’s legitimate need to maintain
safety).
181. See Ascolese v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 925 F. Supp. 351, 355 (E.D. Pa.
1996) (citing T.L.O.) (indicating there were permissible special needs present in
this case).
182. See id. (deciding eventually that plaintiff’s individual privacy interests out-
weighed government’s interests); see also Lewis, supra note 15, at 160-61 (citing R
T.L.O.) (discussing development of “special needs” exception at presented by Jus-
tice Blackmun in T.L.O.).
183. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (adding public schools provide exact intended
setting for special needs exception); see also Lewis, supra note 15, at 160 (translat- R
ing Framer’s intent into Fourth Amendment’s requirement for probable cause).
184. See, e.g., Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 656 (finding school’s policy to drug test
athletes is constitutional to meet legitimate safety policy of school).
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schools force students to take a pregnancy test, there is little safety
impetus behind the policy.185  Even though there are limited cir-
cumstances in which a school nurse needs to administer a test for
the safety of the student or the unborn child, in most circum-
stances, “a school official’s alleged administration to a student-ath-
lete of the pregnancy test would constitute an unreasonable search
under the Fourth Amendment.”186  Therefore, courts must take
this rule and apply it more strictly to prevent unfettered intrusion
of a young woman’s privacy and to prevent the gender discrimina-
tion inherent in forced pregnancy testing.187
D. Key Cases: The Lineage of Forced Pregnancy Tests and the
Impact on Athletics
While limited caselaw exists on the specific constitutionality of
forced pregnancy tests in school athletics, a plethora of analogous
cases present a strong legal foundation for continuing to ban
forced pregnancy tests.188  First, this section discusses Ascolese v. Se.
Pa. Transp. Auth.,189 where the Eastern District of Pennsylvania em-
phasizes that a government entity may only test for pregnancy when
essential public safety interests are at stake.190  Next, this section
analyzes Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab.,191 where the
Ninth Circuit amends the lower court’s rationale, which found that
women have very little privacy interest in their pregnancy status.192
185. See Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 301 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding defendant
in this case was also not entitled to qualified immunity because his conduct was not
reasonable); Lewis, supra note 15, at 183 (questioning what safety precautions R
would be behind forcing young female athlete to take forced pregnancy test).
186. Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 301 (establishing baseline rule that forced preg-
nancy tests are unreasonable unless narrow and serious health concern does exist).
187. For further discussion on need for courts to strictly implement this rule,
see infra notes 252-302 and accompanying text. R
188. For further discussion on analogous caselaw setting foundation for ban-
ning forced pregnancy tests, see infra notes 197-223 and accompanying text. R
189. 925 F. Supp. 351 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding no-notice pregnancy test of
employee could run afoul of Fourth Amendment).
190. See id. at 357 (adding Ascolese’s employer did not have legitimate public
safety interest in testing her for pregnancy).
191. 135 F.3d 1260 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding district court erred in granting
summary judgment to defendants regarding constitutional claim against preg-
nancy tests); see also Elizabeth Pendo, Race, Sex, and Genes at Work: Uncovering the
Lessons of Norman-Bloodsaw, Comment, 10 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 227, 228
(2010) (discussing Congress’ acknowledgement Norman-Bloodsaw is seminal case in
upholding privacy interests in pregnancy testing).
192. See Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1269 (asserting privacy involved with
pregnancy tests implicates Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights).
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Finally, this section ends with an analysis of Gruenke v. Seip,193 where
the Third Circuit directly addressed a young athlete’s forced preg-
nancy test and found the school’s actions to violate the plaintiff’s
Fourth Amendment right to privacy.194  In all of these cases, the
courts highlight the privacy interest in pregnancy status, thus em-
phasizing the needs for future courts to follow suit.195   Conse-
quently, future courts must heed the warnings of these cases and
implement a bright line rule prohibiting forcing young athletes to
take pregnancy tests.196
1. Unnecessary Pregnancy Testing: Ascolese
In Ascolese, the Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Au-
thority (SEPTA) forced its employee, an adult female police officer,
Lisa Ascolese, to take a pregnancy test as a part of her fitness test.197
Originally, the district court found that Ascolese’s Fourth Amend-
ment rights were not violated.198  Because the district court only
granted the defendant’s summary judgment in some matters, but
not in others, the defendants filed a motion for reconsideration.199
One year later, when Justice Pollak reconsidered the case, he fully
granted all parts of the defendant’s motion for summary judg-
ment.200  This section focuses on the reconsideration of Ascolese.201
193. 225 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding pregnancy test constituted search
under Fourth Amendment and pregnancy test in this case was unreasonable). See
generally Lewis, supra note 15, at 166-69 (presenting facts of Gruenke and discussing R
implications of decision).
194. See Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 308 (reversing and remanding lower court’s deci-
sion to grant defendant’s summary judgment).
195. For further discussion on privacy interests discussed in each of afore-
mentioned cases, see infra notes 197-245 and accompanying text. R
196. For further discussion on importance of implementing bright line rule,
see infra notes 246-302 and accompanying text. R
197. See Ascolese v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 925 F. Supp. 351, 354 (E.D. Pa.
1996) (noting pregnancy test was to be urine test that would be administered to all
female employees who needed to undergo fitness program). See generally Lewis,
supra note 15, at 169 (comparing analysis in Ascolese to analysis in another notable R
case, Gruenke).
198. See Ascolese v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 902 F. Supp. 533, 554 (E.D. Pa.
1995) (denying summary judgment for defendants regarding Fourth Amendment
claim against pregnancy tests).
199. See Ascolese, 925 F. Supp. at 365 (treating defendant’s motion for recon-
sideration as renewed motion for summary judgment).
200. See id. (noting SEPTA’s argument that its interest in having Ascolese take
pregnancy test is greater than her interest in privacy); see also Lewis, supra note 15, R
at 170 (discussing court’s reasoning in finding that Ascolese’s privacy interests
were overcome by governmental interests).
201. For further discussion on legal analysis in Ascolese, see infra notes 197-210 R
and accompanying text.
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The district court conducted their analysis of the Plaintiff’s
Fourth Amendment claim by balancing SEPTA’s interest in forcing
their employees to take a pregnancy test and the Plaintiff’s reasona-
ble expectations of privacy.202  Originally, the court found that
SEPTA did have a strong interest in testing female employees for
pregnancy, but that SEPTA could not produce evidence demon-
strating that they could not have made their fitness tests any less
rigorous to accommodate pregnant women.203  Generally, under
the Fourth Amendment, the government agency administering the
test has the burden of demonstrating that the test is necessarily tai-
lored to the job at hand.204  However, in the reconsideration, the
court notes that SEPTA did fulfill that burden by submitting an ex-
pert witness’ affidavit, stating that SEPTA could not have made its
fitness program less rigorous.205  Despite the court’s hesitation in
using the affidavit as dispositive proof of necessity, the court still
found that SEPTA met its burden by changing their policy.206
Next, the court found that the Plaintiff’s reasonable expecta-
tions of privacy were diminished by work circumstances.207  The
court did acknowledge that the Plaintiff had a strong and pointed
privacy interest in keeping her pregnancy status private.208  How-
202. See Ascolese, 925 F. Supp. at 356-57 (finding eventually that SEPTA’s inter-
ests did not outweigh those of Ascolese).
203. See Ascolese v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 902 F. Supp. 533, 550-51 (E.D. Pa.
1995) (citing Anonymous Fireman v. City of Willoughby, 779 F. Supp. 402, 417
(N.D. Ohio 1991)) (adding it is defendant’s burden of proof to show that disputed
test is necessary).
204. See, e.g., Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs. Ass’n., 489 U.S. 602, 633 (1989)
(exemplifying when mandatory test is reasonable, as when employees are handing
dangerous equipment and could be putting themselves in danger if under influ-
ence of any substance); Holton v. Dep’t of the Navy, 884 F.3d 1142, 1146 (D.C. Cir.
2018) (holding mandatory drug testing is Fourth Amendment search that must
past “constitutional muster” to be reasonable”); Anonymous Fireman, 779 F. Supp. at
417 (finding burden is on government agency administering test to demonstrate
constitutional necessity of test).
205. See Ascolese, 925 F. Supp. at 355 (noting remaining skepticism with neces-
sity of SEPTA administering pregnancy tests to female employees).
206. See id. (accepting SEPTA’s new policy because the policy strongly advises
women to take pregnancy test before undergoing fitness exam instead of requiring
them to take test); see also W.E. Shipley, Annotation, Requiring Submission to Physical
Examination or Test as Violation of Constitutional Rights, 25 A.L.R. 2d 1407 (1952)
(noting SEPTA’s interest would have been more valid had they only strongly en-
couraged female employees to take pregnancy test).
207. See Ascolese, 925 F. Supp. at 355 (admitting while district court originally
thought Ascolese’s expectations were not diminished by work circumstances,
SEPTA’s affidavit explaining work conditions did diminish Ascolese’s privacy
expectations).
208. See Ascolese v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 902 F. Supp. 533, 549-51 (E.D. Pa.
1995) (finding Ascolese’s right to privacy of pregnancy status was strong enough to
require that SEPTA has compelling interest in mandating pregnancy test); see also
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ever, SEPTA’s working conditions lowered the Plaintiff’s privacy ex-
pectations because all SEPTA police officers share one locker and
shower facility, must undergo frequent fitness and medical exami-
nations, and must participate in CPR, first aid, and firearms train-
ings.209  Despite the lowered expectation, the court found the test
to be unreasonable because SEPTA did not present a sufficiently
compelling interest for mandated pregnancy tests.210
2. No-Consent Pregnancy Testing: Norman-Bloodsaw
The issue in this case is whether an employee who undergoes
an employee health exam can be tested for pregnancy without her
knowledge.211  The district court granted the defendant’s motion
for dismissal on all claims, including the constitutional privacy
claims.212  The plaintiffs appealed.213
As a condition of employment, the plaintiffs had to submit
blood and urine samples, some of which were tested for pregnancy,
some were tested for syphilis, and some were tested for the sickle
Ascolese, 925 F. Supp. at 356 (acknowledging court’s original opinion found inter-
est in privacy protections for pregnancy status is very strong); L. CAMILLE HÉBERT,
EMPLOYEE PRIVACY LAW § 10:6, Westlaw (database updated 2019) (noting in As-
colese, the court found that “there should be little doubt that the collection of bod-
ily fluid in order to determine if an employee is pregnant violates both subjective
and objective expectations of privacy; information about pregnancy is personal in-
formation of a very intimate kind”). See generally Lewis, supra note 15, at 176 (con- R
necting privacy interest in Ascolese to recognized body privacy interest in Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)).
209. See Ascolese, 925 F. Supp. at 356 (stating overarching goal in implement-
ing these regulatory policies is to promote public safety); see also Skinner v. Ry.
Labor Execs. Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 627 (1989) (noting privacy expectations “are
diminished by reason of their [employees’] participation in an industry that is reg-
ulated pervasively to ensure safety, a goal dependent, in substantial part, on the
health and fitness of covered employees”); Lewis, supra note 15, at 169-70 (compar- R
ing “diminished level of privacy” analysis in Ascolese to diminished expectation of
privacy courts place on athletes, both student and professional).
210. See Ascolese, 925 F. Supp. at 356 (denying defendant’s motion for sum-
mary judgment); see also Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Lab., 135 F.3d
1260, 1264 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding pregnancy information is “highly private and
sensitive medical . . . information . . . .”); Lewis, supra note 15, at 176 (discussing R
court’s acknowledgment that employees have many reasons not to want to reveal
pregnancy status to employee, including not wanting to disclose miscarriage or
abortion); Hébert, supra note 208 (“Even if an employer is able to make such a R
showing [of a valid interest in pregnancy testing], the considerable interests of
employees in such private information should outweigh any legitimate interest of
the employer in that information.”).
211. See Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1264 (describing issue on appeal and
noting test also involved results for syphilis and sickle cell trait).
212. See id. (discussing procedural history of case at hand).
213. See id. (noting claim also involved violation of Title VII and Americans
with Disabilities Act).
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cell trait.214  The plaintiffs claim that their blood and urine samples
were tested for pregnancy without their knowledge or consent.215
Further, the plaintiffs allege that their employer did not take the
proper safeguards to prevent the results from spreading to other
departments throughout Lawrence Berkeley Laboratories.216
Even though the privacy aspect of this case primarily addresses
due process rights, the Ninth Circuit acknowledges the very high
Fourth Amendment and due process privacy interests that are vio-
lated by forced testing.217  In this analysis, the Ninth Circuit points
out that the district court erred in finding that the pregnancy tests
were minimally intrusive under the Fourth Amendment because
“[o]ne can think of few subject areas more personal and more
likely to implicate privacy interests than that of one’s health or ge-
netic make-up.”218  Further, the Ninth Circuit has held in several
circumstances that the Constitution does not allow for unregulated
inquiries into sexual matters that are completely unrelated to job
performance.219  This rule is especially implicated when the em-
ployer is testing for a part of a woman’s health that carries the high-
est expectation of privacy.220
214. See id. at 1265 (adding these tests were discontinued, but that plaintiffs
were still affected by tests).
215. See id. (alleging only women were tested for pregnancy, analogous to
how only African Americans were tested for sickle cell trait).
216. See id. (noting even though no safeguards were implemented, there are
no allegations that results were disseminated to other parties). See also Cristina E.
Echevarria, Case Note, Norman-Bloodsaw v. Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory 135 F.3d
1260 (9th Cir. 1998), 29 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 71, 72-73 (1999) (providing suc-
cinct description of Norman-Bloodsaw facts).
217. See Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1269 (“[I]t goes without saying that the
most basic violation possible involves the performance of unauthorized tests—that is,
the non-consensual retrieval of previously unrevealed medical information that
may be unknown even to plaintiffs.”).
218. Id. (adding pregnancy test will only be found reasonable when govern-
mental interests outweigh personal privacy interests); see also Pendo, supra note
191, at 234 (emphasizing negative psychological impact that forced pregnancy test- R
ing has on women by quoting plaintiff, saying “‘I felt so violated,’ says Ellis [plain-
tiff]. ‘I thought, ‘Oh, my god. Do they think all black women are nasty and sleep
around?’”).
219. See Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1269 (citing Schowengerdt v. General
Dynamics Corp., 823 F.2d 1328, 1336 (9th Cir. 1987)) (noting both syphilis and
pregnancy can carry negative implications about sexual history and activity). See
generally ROBERT D. LINKS, CAL. CIVIL PRACTICE CIVIL RIGHTS LITIG. § 6.25, Westlaw
(database updated 2019) (acknowledging what employer did in Norman-Bloodsaw
implicated “basic privacy problem—a party obtaining knowledge of private medi-
cal facts that may be unknown even to the plaintiffs without their consent or
knowledge”).
220. See Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1269 (discussing high privacy interests
at stake when employer tests unknowing employee for pregnancy); Lewis, supra
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The Ninth Circuit, in emphasizing the highly intrusive nature
of a pregnancy test, also points out that the intrusiveness of the test
does not disappear if the person taking the test is personally willing
to discuss their condition.221  Regardless, unauthorized and unreg-
ulated testing puts employees in an uncomfortable, intrusive, and
unconstitutional position that has nothing to do with their ability to
perform on the job.222  Due to the privacy interests at stake, the
Ninth Circuit rejected the summary judgment decision to discover
whether the tests were truly not consented to by the plaintiffs.223
3. High School Athletics: Gruenke
The plaintiff, Leah Gruenke was a seventeen-year-old high
school student and athlete on her school’s swim team, and the de-
fendant, Michael Seip, was the varsity swim coach for Gruenke’s
team.224  Seip noticed that Gruenke was nauseated and tired and
that her body was changing rapidly, so he asked his assistant swim
coach, a female, to discuss the possibility of pregnancy with
Gruenke.225  During that conversation, and in subsequent conversa-
tions with other members of the swim team, Gruenke refused to
admit to a possibility of pregnancy, especially because “she felt that
her condition was nobody’s business.”226  Some team mothers even
noticed Gruenke’s changing body, bought a pregnancy test, and
gave the pregnancy test to Seip to figure out a way to administer the
test to Gruenke.227  Seip recruited two girls to convince Gruenke to
take the test, but Gruenke continuously denied ever having sexual
intercourse and refused to take a test unless everyone on the team
note 15, at 177 (bolstering privacy interests at stake by comparing this case to R
Ascolese).
221. See Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1270 (adding that, due to privacy inter-
ests involved, testing is not de minimis intrusion, by any means).
222. See id. (noting how consenting to general medical examination is not
equivalent of consenting to being tested for pregnancy of syphilis); see also Pendo,
supra note 191, at 251 (noting while employer claimed to test for pregnancy to R
protect employees from reproductive harms, there was no indication that women
were actually faced with any reproductive harms).
223. See Norman-Bloodsaw, 135 F.3d at 1270 (reversing district court’s disposi-
tion on privacy interests issue of case at hand).
224. See Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 295 (3d Cir. 2000) (presenting facts
surrounding Fourth Amendment case on forced pregnancy tests).
225. See id. at 295-96 (stating exact context of conversation is unclear, but it is
clear that conversation did happen).
226. See id. at 296 (stating Gruenke was approached by school nurse and
school counselor, but Gruenke still emphatically denied any possibility of getting
pregnant).
227. See id. (discussing conflict in stories surrounding pregnancy test Gruenke
eventually took).
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was subjected to a pregnancy test as well.228  Eventually, Gruenke
volunteered to take the test and found out that she was pregnant.229
Unfortunately, the negative interactions did not stop there:
[A]fter [Gruenke’s] baby was born, Seip tried to alienate
[Gruenke] from her peers. Specifically, [Gruenke] testi-
fied that after she quit the private swim team that Seip also
coached, Seip told members of his team not to sit with
[Gruenke] during swim meets. Moreover, [Gruenke] as-
serts that during her last year of high school, Seip refused
to speak to her and retaliated against her by taking her out
of several swim meets.230
This suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, primarily under the
claim that a mandated pregnancy test by the plaintiff’s swim coach
constituted an illegal search in violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment.231  Undoubtedly, the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition of
unreasonable government searches extends to public schools.232
The district court granted summary judgment for the defendant on
qualified immunity grounds.233  The Gruenkes appealed.234
In the Third Circuit’s analysis, the court set a baseline that the
constitutionality of a Fourth Amendment search relies on the rea-
sonableness of the search.235  While probable cause is often the
standard, there are “special needs” circumstances where the obtain-
ment of probable cause for each search and seizure is unrealistic.236
Under the special needs exception, the probable cause require-
228. See id. (adding Gruenke wrote letter to Seip that he never read, “stating
that Seip had no right to make her take a pregnancy test, that she was not showing
any symptoms of being pregnant, and that she had never had sexual intercourse”).
229. See id. at 297 (noting Seip did not share information about Gruenke’s
pregnancy with any other administrators).
230. See id. (demonstrating unfortunate and negative consequences pregnant
teenagers often face before and after their pregnancies).
231. See id. at 297-98 (adding claims of interference with right to familial pri-
vacy, privacy in personal matters, and First Amendment rights to free speech and
association).
232. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 347-48 (1985) (holding students
clearly have Fourth Amendment rights in school context). See generally
Ehlenberger, supra note 179, at 31 (explaining students have constitutional rights R
in schools, but that their expectations of privacy are lowered in this context).
233. See Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 295 (adding state law claims were dismissed with-
out prejudice).
234. See id. (discussing procedural history of case at hand).
235. See id. at 300 (stating this reasonableness is often defined by probable
cause, except in those situations where probable cause is not effective).
236. See id. at 300-301 (using T.L.O. as demonstrative example of special
needs exception to Fourth Amendment baseline requirement for probable cause).
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ment is ignored and courts analyze whether the government’s inter-
est in conducting the search outweighed the individual’s
expectation of privacy in the public school setting.237  In considering
this balancing act, the Third Circuit emphasizes that public school
students, especially athletes, generally have a lower expectation of
privacy because they are submitting themselves to inherently more
public environments.238  Additionally, the government’s interest
must be “‘important enough to justify the particular search at
hand, in light of other factors that show the search to be relatively
intrusive upon a genuine expectation of privacy.’”239
Despite the somewhat complex legal foundation laid by the
Third Circuit, the holding is quite clear:
[A] school official’s alleged administration to a student
athlete of the pregnancy tests would constitute an unrea-
sonable search under the Fourth Amendment. Although
student athletes have a very limited expectation of privacy,
a school cannot compel a student to take a pregnancy test
absent a legitimate health concern about a possible preg-
nancy and the exercise of some discretion. . . . [A]n offi-
cial cannot, however, require a student to submit to this
intrusion merely to satisfy his curiosity.240
Effectively, while the court acknowledged students’ lower privacy
expectations, the court also explicitly limits how a school can glean
information.241 Consequently, the precedent, as based on Supreme
Court precedent, is quite clear that a mandatory pregnancy test is
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, absent exigent
circumstances.242
237. See id. at 301 (laying foundations for analysis surrounding Fourth
Amendment search case).
238. See id. (citing Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656-57 (1995))
(discussing public school athletes have lower expectation of privacy because they
agree to follow even more regulations than average public school students).
239. Id. (quoting Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 660) (discussing United States Su-
preme Court precedent allowing for governmental interests to outweigh privacy
interests in Fourth Amendment context). See generally MICHAEL I. LEVIN, PA.
SCHOOL PERSONNEL ACTIONS § 15:7, Westlaw (database updated 2019) (citing
Gruenke and Fraternal Order of Police v. Phila, 812 F.2d 105, 112-13 (3d Cir.
1987)) (stating more personal information creates more legitimate expectations
that information will not be unwillingly disclosed to other parties).
240. Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 301 (noting pregnancy test might be more reasona-
ble under special and urgent health circumstances that are not present here).
241. See id. (acknowledging possibility of schools having legitimate reasons to
test for pregnancy).
242. See MCQUILLEN THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPS. § 46:105, Westlaw
(database updated 2019) (reiterating holding in Gruenke).  For further discussion
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However, one of the consequential issues presented in the
Third Circuit’s rationale of this case is how little interest the govern-
ment has in testing for pregnancy, not how highly sensitive a preg-
nancy test is.243  Even though the court noted that the government
must have a strong interest in administering the pregnancy test, the
court failed to properly acknowledge that the government will sel-
dom have a strong enough interest in pregnancy test results.244  If a
high federal court refuses to acknowledge the almost-insurmounta-
ble privacy interest in keeping pregnancy test results personal, stu-
dents and government employees alike are left vulnerable to
embarrassing and intrusive situations in a public setting.245
E. Yes, Pregnancy Tests in Athletics are Unreasonable Searches
Regarding Kyllo, even though pregnancy tests are procedures
that anyone can purchase at a drugstore, the results from those tests
are often not information the female wants to make public.246
Therefore, both the female’s expectation of privacy beyond that of
more freely shared information and the likelihood that the
mandatory pregnancy test is an unreasonable search are height-
ened.247  The pregnancy test being accessible does not necessarily
yield an assumption that the results are willingly public informa-
on rationale of Third Circuit in Gruenke, see supra notes 224-245 and accompany- R
ing text.
243. See Gruenke, 225 F.3d at 301 (emphasizing student’s privacy interest is
very low in public school context); Lewis, supra note 15, at 167-68 (noting this R
reasoning is evident from court pointing out there may be circumstances in which
school or government employer can test for pregnancy).
244. See Lewis, supra note 15, at 168 (calling court’s focus on government
interest “misplaced”).
245. See id. at 183 (finding court will not take away individual’s personal deci-
sion by forcing her reveal her pregnancy).  For further discussion on negative im-
plications of forced pregnancy tests, see supra notes 252-292 and accompanying R
text.
246. See Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 (2001) (hinting that privacy at
issue corresponds with results of search, not necessarily search itself).
247. See California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40-41 (1988) (citing United
States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397 (3d Cir. 1981)) (holding searching through
someone’s discarded trash is reasonable because petitioners, placing their garbage
“‘in an area particularly suited for public inspection in a manner of speaking, pub-
lic consumption, for the express purpose of having strangers take it,’ could not
have had a reasonable expectation of privacy” (quoting United States v.
Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397 (3d Cir. 1981))); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293
(1966) (finding there was not search when petitioner revealed information to
friend, thus demonstrating his careless attitude about exposing certain informa-
tion to public).
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tion.248  Additionally, the Supreme Court, in Florida v. Riley,249 sug-
gested that their holding against finding an unreasonable search
might have been different had the police obtained intimate details
about the respondent’s life.250  While the obtainment of intimate
details is not the standard for deciding on the reasonableness of a
search, the unwilling exposure of intimate details surely contributes
to an individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.251
IV. “WHY DO I CARE?”: HOW DISCRIMINATION IN SPORTS
IMPLICATES A LARGER ISSUE
This section takes the discussion of forced pregnancy tests be-
yond the legal analysis, and more into the social and psychological
implications of being forced to take a pregnancy test and exper-
iencing negative treatment when the results are positive.252  Unfor-
tunately, there are several examples from around the world that tell
a sad story of a girl who had a promising future but was unsup-
ported by her school when she became pregnant.253   Conse-
quently, public schools forcing young girls to submit to pregnancy
tests carries much greater implications beyond a Fourth Amend-
248. See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 456-60 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(“But I cannot agree that one knowingly exposes an area to the public solely be-
cause a helicopter may legally fly above it. Under the plurality’s exceedingly grudg-
ing Fourth Amendment theory, the expectation of privacy is defeated if a single
member of the public could conceivably position herself to see into the area in
question without doing anything illegal.”).
249. See id. (holding a helicopter flying 400 feet over respondent’s yard did
not constitute unreasonable search because helicopter was in public airspace).
250. See id. at 452 (majority opinion) (implying lack of intimate details ob-
tained supported Court’s finding against unreasonable search).
251. See id. at 463 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (questioning where Fourth
Amendment requires that intimate details must be obtained for there to be Fourth
Amendment intrusion). See, e.g., Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 301 (2000) (“The
nature of the intrusion must also be considered when determining whether the
search is unreasonable. A urinalysis test, like the one conducted for drugs in
Vernonia, is clearly intrusive because it reveals personal information but can be
made less so by having the student take it in private, tailoring it so that it tests only
for drugs, and limiting the disclosure of the information it reveals.”).
252. For further discussion on the implications of forced pregnancy tests and
a positive pregnancy result at a young age, see supra notes 253-292 and accompany- R
ing text.
253. See, e.g., Ivana Kottasová, They Failed Mandatory Pregnancy Tests at School.
Then They were Expelled, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2018/10/11/health/
tanzania-pregnancy-test-asequals-intl/index.html [https://perma.cc/QD9Q-
H6G6] (last visited Feb. 20, 2020) (detailing story of young Tanzanian girls who
could no longer get education because they were pregnant); Zegeye, supra note 23 R
(discussing school that actively excluded pregnant students from leading normal
educational life).
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ment violation.254  Due to the demands of motherhood and other
complicated social pressures, young mothers are less likely to con-
tinue their education.255 Specifically, many young women in this
situation will not even have the opportunity to finish high school.256
Because she does not have a high school diploma, the young
mother is then forced to take a low-paying job to support herself
and her child.257  The already-low motivation to finish school as a
young mother is even further hindered when the young mother’s
school is actively unwelcoming to the mother.258
One prominent example of a school’s negative response to
even the possibility of teenage pregnancy is evinced in the Delhi
Charter School in Louisiana.259  In 2012, a Louisiana charter school
was under scrutiny because of a strict policy requiring female stu-
dents who are suspected to be pregnant to submit to pregnancy
tests.260  The school’s pregnancy policy holds that “the school has a
right to . . . force testing upon girls. . . . [A] positive test result, or
failure to take the test at all, means administrators can force her to
pursue a course of home study if she wishes to continue her educa-
tion with the school.”261  Unfortunately, a school’s harsh and nega-
tive actions about pregnancy create a discriminatory environment
254. See generally Rebekah Levine Coley & P. Lindsay Chase-Lansdale, Adoles-
cent Pregnancy and Parenthood: Recent Evidence and Future Directions, 53 AM. PSYCHOLO-
GIST 152 (Feb. 1988) (2011), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/a4a4/
f985e399f347651d82f6b115f89bba7fd98e.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PEV-ND9Z]
(discussing both causes and impacts of teenage pregnancy).
255. See About Teen Pregnancy, CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/teenpregnancy/about/index.htm [https://perma.cc/6XP9-
23A6] (last visited Sept. 22, 2020) (finding only fifty percent of teenage mothers
receive high school diploma by age twenty-two).
256. See Levine Coley & Chase-Lansdale, supra note 254, at 155-56 (denoting R
clearly that educational attainment is one of largest barriers teenage mothers
face).
257. See id. at 156 (highlighting early marriage rates and low educational at-
tainment as causes of future low economic attainment in future).
258. See, e.g., Kottasová, supra note 253 (discussing international case where R
young girls could no longer attend school because of societal implications associ-
ated with teen pregnancy); Zegeye, supra note 23 (evincing school in Louisiana R
would not allow pregnant mothers to attend school).
259. See Zegeye, supra note 23 (discussing Louisiana charter school’s policy to R
kick out female students who were either pregnant or who refused to take
mandatory pregnancy test); see also School Policy Forces Students to Take Pregnancy
Tests, Bans Pregnant Teens, FOX NEWS (Oct. 27, 2015), https://www.foxnews.com/
health/school-policy-forces-students-to-take-pregnancy-tests-bans-pregnant-teens
[https://perma.cc/AUU6-A4L9] (describing Delhi Charter School’s policy and at-
testing to constitutional illegality of discrimination).
260. See Zegeye, supra note 23 (taking strong stance on Delhi Charter School’s R
strict pregnancy policy).
261. Id. (emphasizing heavy and unacceptable discriminatory toll that this
policy takes on young female students).
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that forces pregnant girls out of receiving an education.262  The
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) almost immediately
pointed out that this policy is in direct violation of Title IX, which
prohibits any sex discrimination in a federally funded school.263
Shortly after the ACLU’s involvement, Delhi Charter School
changed its policy.264  However, the incident sent a clear and indeli-
ble message about the negative treatment of young pregnant
women.265
Whether the school forces students to take pregnancy tests or
encourages pregnant students to leave, the school sends a message
that pregnant students should be ashamed of themselves.266  When
a school tests students for drugs or searches them for weapons, the
school is searching for evidence of illegal and unsafe activity.267
However, when a school tests for pregnancy, the school implies that
sexual, behavior and pregnancy is criminal as well, even though it is
surely not.268  Consequently, young women forced to undergo preg-
nancy tests are treated as if they have engaged in criminal and
deplorable behavior.269  This exclusion is well evinced in Gruenke,
where the defendant swim coach discouraged students from sitting
262. See Pregnant and Parenting Teens, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, https://
www.aclu.org/pregnant-and-parenting-teens?redirect=womens-rights/pregnant-
and-parenting-teens [https://perma.cc/7F4T-6JKR] (last visited Feb. 20, 2020)
(noting this discrimination is illegal under Title IX because schools who treat preg-
nant students poorly are inherently treating male and female students differently);
see also Linda Mangel, Teen Pregnancy, Discrimination, and the Dropout Rate, AM. CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION OF WASH. (Oct. 25, 2010), https://www.aclu-wa.org/blog/teen-
pregnancy-discrimination-and-dropout-rate [https://perma.cc/ADX4-46JX] (em-
phasizing “[d]iscrimination against pregnant students is strictly prohibited by Title
IX—the federal law banning sex discrimination in public schools—but it is wide-
spread nonetheless”).
263. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1986) (listing exceptions to general rule against
discrimination); see also Pregnant and Parenting Teens, supra note 262 (describing R
illegal implications of school’s discriminatory policy).
264. See Kempner, supra note 19 (adding that even though policy was quickly R
changed, it was not challenged by anyone for six years).
265. See id. (noting Delhi Charter School’s policy presents appropriate time
for country to consider how pregnant teenagers are being treated).
266. See id. (discussing overly traditional values that are incorrectly imple-
mented in schools do not treat pregnant students equally).
267. See Lewis, supra note 15, at 182-83 (comparing governmental interest in R
testing for drugs with governmental interest in testing for pregnancy); see, e.g.,
Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995) (finding school’s drug test-
ing policy is constitutional under Fourth Amendment).
268. See Lewis, supra note 15, at 182 (noting only criminal behavior regarding R
sexual activity could be rape, but that is not often what tests are seeking to
discover).
269. See Kempner, supra note 19 (discussing how mandatory pregnancy test- R
ing can imply to young girl that she is criminal because she is being treated as one
when she is forced to submit to pregnancy testing).
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near the plaintiff after discovering (forcibly) that she was preg-
nant.270  In forcing a pregnancy test, the school also usurps young
students’ decisions to participate in school activities and to reveal
their pregnancy status in whatever manner they see fit, if at all.271
Additionally, they are treated as if their pregnancy is negatively in-
fluencing the rest of the students.272  While administrators disguise
this message as a protection for the baby and the mother, the real
impetus is to uphold the “image” of the school.273  For example, in
Hicks v. Wingate Elementary School274 a young student who learned of
her pregnancy was kicked out of school because she would be a
“bad example” for other students.275  After New Mexico’s ACLU re-
quested that the plaintiff be returned to school, the administration
agreed, but retaliated by announcing to an assembly of students
that the plaintiff was pregnant.276  The case was ultimately dis-
missed in favor of the defendants.277  By ushering pregnant stu-
dents out of schools, the ultimate result is to wrongfully and
continuously bolster the idea that women and men should be
treated differently.278  For example, Louisiana’s policy “treats a
male and a female engaging in the same behavior differently and
forces the female to suffer public humiliation and disruption to her
270. See Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 297 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting defendant
refused to speak to her and did not allow her to participate in certain swim meets,
even after plaintiff’s baby was born).
271. See Lewis, supra note 15, at 183 (noting control over student contributes R
to discriminatory environment).
272. See id. (“Drug users create a potential risk for other students and at the
very least are distractions. In contrast, a pregnant student does not have this same
effect upon the educational environment. A pregnant student does not pose a risk
to other students. A pregnant student is not the same type of a distraction as a
student on drugs. Overall, there is less of a need to deter pregnancy in order to
maintain a productive educational environment than there is to deter drug use.”).
273. See Kempner, supra note 19 (“Schools, especially schools like Delhi Char- R
ter which clearly prides itself on academic excellence, have an image to uphold
and they fear that pregnant teens taint their reputations. As Greene explains: ‘The
presence of pregnant girls in the building changes the image of the school—peo-
ple think, if you’ve made that kind of decision you probably aren’t the kind of
person we want walking through the halls.’”).
274. CV 12-0231, 2013 WL 12328884 (D.N.M. Sept. 13, 2013) (discussing legal
implications of public school humiliating female pregnant student).
275. See id. at *2 (adding plaintiff was not allowed in school or in school dor-
mitories following disclosure of her pregnancy).
276. See id. at *3 (noting specifically plaintiff was summoned from her class-
room to attend this assembly and have her pregnancy announced without her
permission).
277. See id. at *7 (stating it is Congress’ responsibility to find remedy for
plaintiff).
278. See Kempner, supra note 19 (emphasizing inherent inequality in punish- R
ing young girls for getting pregnant, especially when young boys equally contrib-
uted to pregnancy).
42
Jeffrey S. Moorad Sports Law Journal, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/mslj/vol28/iss1/5
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLS\28-1\VLS105.txt unknown Seq: 43  4-JAN-21 11:50
2021] “CAN I HAVE SOME PRIVACY?” 213
education.”279  Even though Louisiana’s policy is the most blatant
evidence of forced pregnancy policies, the negative message rings
true through all schools with a hostile environment towards poten-
tially pregnant students.280
Even in professional athletics, these negative impacts are ram-
pant.281  For example, as explained earlier in this Comment, Alysia
Montaño, an American track and field Olympian, lost her sponsor-
ship and Olympic health insurance when she revealed her preg-
nancy.282  Because of the immediate negative impact the athletes
face, both Nike and the Olympics create a very negative environ-
ment surrounding pregnancy.283
Until recently, the Women’s National Basketball Association
(WNBA) also pushed athletes away from pregnancy.284  In 2018,
Skylar Diggins-Smith played pregnant throughout her entire season
with the Dallas Wings.285  She did not tell a single person on her
279. See id. (noting shaming pregnant teenagers sends bad message to entire
student population about how horrible one girl’s personal sexual behavior is).
280. See id. (analyzing several poor messages associated with pregnancy dis-
crimination in schools).
281. See, e.g., Maggie Mertens, supra note 101 (explaining anti-pregnancy cul- R
ture within the WNBA before historic collective bargaining agreement); New York
Times, supra note 101 (describing stresses associated with getting pregnant as pro- R
fessional athlete).
282. See New York Times, supra note 101 (describing Montaño not only lost R
her sponsorship with Nike while pregnant, but also that United States Olympic
Committee stripped her of health insurance during pregnancy); see also Olympic
Track Star Rebukes Sponsorship Pay Penalties for Pregnant Athletes, NAT’L PUBLIC RADIO
(May 26, 2019), https://www.npr.org/2019/05/26/727190926/olympic-track-star-
rebukes-sponsorship-pay-penalties-for-pregnant-athletes [https://perma.cc/MRE6-
G94B] (interviewing Montaño and finding that unless athlete falls within specific
tier system, she will not receive any health insurance during her pregnancy); Alysia
Montaño, Nike Told Me to Dream Crazy, Until I Wanted a Baby, N.Y. TIMES (May 12,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/12/opinion/nike-maternity-leave.html
[https://perma.cc/U8Q8-CQSM] (quoting Phoebe Wright, another Olympic ath-
lete, in saying “Some people think women are racing pregnant for themselves. . . .
[I]t sometimes is, but it’s also because there’s a baby to feed.”).
283. See Montaño, supra note 282 (quoting Phoebe Wright in saying that get- R
ting pregnant while competing is “kiss of death”).
284. See WNBA and WNBPA Reach Tentative Agreement on Groundbreaking Eight-
Year Collective Bargaining Agreement, WOMEN’S NAT’L BASKETBALL ASSOC. (Jan. 14,
2020), https://www.wnba.com/news/wnba-and-wnbpa-reach-tentative-agreement-
on-groundbreaking-eight-year-collective-bargaining-agreement/ [https://
perma.cc/C78T-2QPA] (describing details of collective bargaining agreement re-
sulting from years of fighting for equality).
285. See Mechelle Voepel, Skylar Diggins-Smith Says She Played 2018 Pregnant;
Expresses Lack of Team Support, ESPN (Oct. 19, 2019), https://www.espn.com/
wnba/story/_/id/27882225/skylar-diggins-smith-says-played-2018-pregnant-ex-
presses-lack-team-support [https://perma.cc/Z82P-ZZYL] (quoting Diggins-Smith
in saying that she “didn’t tell a soul” about her pregnancy); see also Skylar Diggins-
Smith (@SkyDigg4), TWITTER (Oct. 19, 2019), https://twitter.com/skydigg4/sta-
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team about her pregnancy or her severe, two-month post-partum
depression.286  After feeling no support from the WNBA, Diggins-
Smith vowed to bring her maternal experience to the negotiations
to ensure that motherhood is normalized, not penalized, in female
sports.287 Finally, in early 2020, the WNBA released a new collective
bargaining agreement, guaranteeing full maternity leave pay to ath-
letes.288  With this decision, the WNBA sent a message to other fe-
male sports organizations that pregnancy is to be celebrated and
respected, not hidden.289
If employers can create a negative culture surrounding profes-
sional female athlete pregnancies, a high school can likely do no
better with young students.290  In both circumstances, the negative
psychological effects of having to hide a pregnancy or having to
unwillingly reveal a pregnancy could be easily avoided.291  There-
fore, in line with steps exemplified by the WNBA, courts must
strictly enforce the Fourth Amendment to protect young girls from
revealing the most personal and life-changing information.292
tus/1185598787177373697?lang=en (“I played the ENTIRE season pregnant last
year! All star, and led league (top 3-5) in MPG . . . didn’t tell a soul.”).
286. See Voepel, supra note 285 (quoting Diggins-Smith in saying that she had R
“limited resources to help me be successful mentally/physically.”); see also Skylar
Diggins-Smith (@SkyDigg4), TWITTER (Oct. 18, 2019, 7:39 PM), https://twit-
ter.com/SkyDigg4/status/1185339648748470273 (“Having no support from your
own organization is unfortunate.”).
287. See Mertens, supra note 101 (highlighting how before recent collective R
bargaining agreement, WNBA players on maternity leave made at least half of their
salaries, which were nearly a tenth of male salaries to start).
288. See WNBA and WNBPA Reach Tentative Agreement on Groundbreaking Eight-
Year Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 284 (noting also that collective bar- R
gaining agreement includes annual childcare stipend of $5,000, two-bedroom
apartment, and planning family benefits for fertility and infertility). See generally
Mertens, supra note 101 (marking collective bargaining agreement as first time any R
professional athletes are guaranteed full pay on maternity leave).
289. See WNBA and WNBPA Reach Tentative Agreement on Groundbreaking Eight-
Year Collective Bargaining Agreement, supra note 284 (quoting Sue Bird, member of R
WNBA Players Association executive committee in saying “When you look at things
like what we’re able to do with maternity leave and family planning. . . . [W]e’re
going to be looked at as—I think—pioneers in the sports world”).
290. For further discussion on the negative culture surrounding pregnancy in
both professional and high school athletics, see supra notes 54-118 and accompany- R
ing text.
291. For further discussion on the impact of a toxic environment surround-
ing pregnancy, see supra notes 252-290 and accompanying text. R
292. For further discussion on why courts must strictly follow the Fourth
Amendment to protect young female athletes from forced pregnancy tests, see
supra notes 246-291 and accompanying text. R
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V. YES, COURTS HAVE THE POWER TO CHANGE
As citizens of the United States, all women, including student
and professional athletes, have the Fourth Amendment right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures by the govern-
ment.293  However, public school students still, given the nature of
their relationship as minors in a public school system, have lower
expectations of privacy.294 These lowered expectations sometimes
result in schools implementing certain policies that infringe upon
the privacy rights of students.295  For example, in Vernonia, the Su-
preme Court found that the school district at issue implemented a
valid policy of drug testing athletes, especially since athletes were at
the center of illegal drug use in the high school.296  Contrarily,
when a school is forcing female athletes to take a pregnancy test,
seldom do courts find a legitimate safety reason behind the
action.297
Professional employers likewise do not have legitimate safety
concerns in testing athletes.298 When women are forced to take a
pregnancy test, they are subjected to having superiors and col-
leagues discover very private and personal information.299  Further,
forcing females to take pregnancy tests inherently puts females in a
position “less than” their male counterparts, who obviously are not
293. For further discussion on the Fourth Amendment rights inherent to
public school students, see supra notes 224-292 and accompanying text. R
294. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656-58 (1995) (detail-
ing inherent characteristics of school environment that lower students’, specifically
athletes’, expectation of privacy); see also New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 338
(1985) (acknowledging school’s legitimate interest in maintaining school disci-
pline, but holding school students to still have right to privacy).
295. For further discussion on the lower expectation of privacy that school
students have, see supra notes 7-21 and accompanying text. R
296. See Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665-66 (concluding school’s policy, while intru-
sive, is reasonable because it is for safety of school).
297. See Lewis, supra note 15, at 183 (questioning whether there are any legiti- R
mate safety reasons behind school administrator forcing student to take pregnancy
test); see, e.g., Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290, 308 (2000) (finding student’s Fourth
Amendment privacy rights were undoubtedly violated when her swim team coach
pressured her into taking pregnancy test).
298. For further discussion on rampant pregnancy and gender discrimination
in professional athletics, see supra notes 54-118 and accompanying text. R
299. See Ascolese v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 902 F. Supp. 533, 550 (E.D. Pa.
1995) (listing private issues could be revealed by forcing pregnancy test, including
subsequent miscarriage or abortion and parts of sexual history). See generally
Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658 (“The other privacy aspect of urinalysis is, of course, the
information it discloses concerning the state of the subject’s body, and the materi-
als he has ingested. In this regard it is significant that the tests at issue here look
only for drugs, and not for whether the student is, for example, epileptic, pregnant,
or diabetic.”) (emphasis added).
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experiencing such a privacy intrusion.300  Consequently, females
feel like social pariahs in the very places where they are meant to be
embraced.301  To prevent this privacy invasion and inevitable dis-
crimination, courts must utilize the Fourth Amendment to empha-
size the privacy interests at stake and deter school administrators
from forcing female athletes to take pregnancy tests.302
Hannah Rogers*
300. See Lewis, supra note 15, at 183 (noting discrimination in this manner is R
violation of Title IX).
301. See generally Kempner, supra note 19 (describing consequences of forced R
pregnancy tests, including girls feeling like they should be ashamed of themselves
and feeling equal to their peers who engaged in illegal activity of ingesting drugs).
302. For further discussion on the steps courts must take to protect young
women, see supra notes 252-301 and accompanying text. R
* J.D. Candidate, Class of 2021, Villanova University Charles Widger School of
Law; Loyola University Chicago, Class of 2018; I would like to thank my family and
friends for supporting my law school career, especially with this publication, every
step of the way. I truly do not know what I would do without this incredible sup-
port system.
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